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OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 
The thesis is structured into six chapters .Chapter one comprises the background of the study, 
statement of the problem, significance of the study, objectives of the study, methodology and 
limitations of the study. 
Chapter two is a discussion on the hydropolitics of the Nile Basin in general along with historical 
treaties and their implication on the prevailing status quo. This chapter also briefly examines 
different theories and doctrines with the two cardinal principles of international water law as 
norms of conventional and customary international law. 
Chapter three briefly surveys different efforts of cooperation that the basin witnessed right up to 
the Nile Bain Initiative (NBI). 
Chapter four treats what benefit sharing, as a concept, is all about, different justifications that 
trigger benefit sharing and some comparative advantages that the Eastern Nile Basin States 
posses. 
Chapter five discusses how benefit sharing is to be set in motion. It also dwells on possible 
mechanisms of benefit sharing and on the major impediments in realizing benefit sharing. 
Finally chapter six gives some conclusions and recommendations on the basis of the whole 
discussion that the study went through. 
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ACRONYMS and ABBREVIATIONS 
AHD   Aswan High Dam 
CESCR   Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
CFA    Cooperative Framework Agreement 
ENSAP   Eastern Nile Subsidiary Action Program 
ENSAPT   Eastern Nile Subsidiary Action Program Team 
ENTRO   Eastern Nile Technical Regional Office 
FAO   Food and Agriculture Organization 
GDP   Gross Domestic Product 
HYDROMET  Hydrometreological Survey of Equatorial Lakes 
ICCON   International Consortium for Cooperation on the Nile 
IWRM   Integrated Water Resource Management 
JMP    Joint Multi -Purpose Program 
LHWP   Lesotho Highland Water Project 
MRC   Mekong River Commission 
NBC   Nile Basin Countries 
NBI   Nile Basin Initiative 
NBTF   Nile Basin Trust Fund 
NGOs   Non-Governmental Organizations 
Nile-COM   Nile-Council of Ministers 
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Nile-SEC   Nile-Secretariat 
Nile-TAC   Nile Technical Advisory Committee 
OMVS Organization pour la Mise en Valeur du Fleuve Senegal (Senegal 
River Basin Development Authority) 
POE   Panel of Experts 
SAP   Subsidiary Action Program 
SVP   Shared Vision Program 
TECCONILE Technical Cooperation Commission for the Promotion and 
Development of Nile 
UNDP   United Nation Development Program 
UNDUGU   “Brotherhood” in Swahili 
UNESCO   United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
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ABSTRACT 
The sharing of the multiple benefits that the common water resource can offer to basin states is a 
relatively new paradigm. Its theoretical flavor lies on its advocacy of a positive – sum – outcome 
where all parties benefit from the integrated and enhanced management of shared watercourses. 
This new approach of trans-boundary water management is undergoing a test in the Nile Basin 
in general and in the Eastern Nile sub-basin in particular through the transitional cooperative 
framework (NBI). The initiative aspired to forge a permanent Cooperative Framework 
Agreement (CFA) that would embody governing principles of water management to ease, 
moderate and balance the age old negative-sum predicament that has characterized the Nile 
Basin. 
Conceptualizing the bundle of benefits as it may be revealed in the economic, environmental, 
social and political spheres and spotting which benefit lies where according to a comparative 
advantage analysis is not  so much a problem as crafting a workable formulae to equitably and 
fairly share benefits among riparians-ensuring a distributive justice. 
The challenge of realizing the conceived opportunities to the benefit of all is attributed to a 
number of complex and diverse political, legal, historical and national interest issues that 
underlie the equation. 
In the Nile basin, basin states agreed under the auspices of the transitional cooperative 
arrangements to equitably and reasonably utilize the Nile waters pending the birth of a 
Permanent Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA). Such an agreement debated and 
negotiated for about a decade, is not yet delivered. This state of the fact has caused a shadow of 
doubt and despair as to whether cooperation in the Nile Basin is an illusion or achievable 
reality. This statement may be criticized as being premature and may even be taken as 
pessimist’s point of view. However, given the outstanding nature of the bone of contention that 
arrested the negotiation momentum (the issue of ensuring water security to current uses and 
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rights) unless a breakthrough is witnessed that would unlock the impasse headway appears to be 
very difficult. 
A failure to have a compromised stance on the equitable and reasonable use of the Nile Waters 
is a visible threat to the whole effort of enhancing the welfare of the people of the basin and to 
the ecological integrity of the basin as well. Equitable and reasonable utilization of the common 
water resource, in whatever form (volumetric allocation and/or benefit sharing) may be 
envisaged, cannot sustainably operate without a permanent but flexible institutionalized 
Cooperative Framework Agreement. Viewed from this perspective, the abundant and diversified 
benefits that the Nile at the basin and sub-basin level would provide cannot sustainably and 
equitably be exploited without such an agreement as a prerequisite. This hard and costly choice 
provides a sobering moment for the basin states. 
Against all these backdrop this study tries to investigate, in the Eastern Nile context, what types 
of benefits can be reaped, how can these benefits be fairly and equitably be distributed, how is 
benefit sharing approached by some other international river basins and what are the key 
challenges that impede translating the vision into action. The study further argues that benefit 
sharing mechanism can deliver the highest possible utility along with simultaneous/parallel 
operation of an allocation regime whereby basin states should establish a property right over 
their legitimate share of the water according to negotiated and widely accepted international 
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CHAPTER ONE- INTRODUCTION 
Water and development do have an organic nexus. The supply of this vital resource in arid and 
semi –arid regions assumes a national security character when it becomes a question of survival. 
The uneven distribution of water across the world’s various regions and countries within each 
region makes the issue of access a big challenge. 
Not only is the finite and scarce nature of this vital resource becomes problematic but also the 
modes of establishing access to it. Issues of access to shared water if not handled sensitively 
could ignite conflict among riparian. Especially, the potential of conflict is real in a situation 
where asymmetrical power relation prevails. Such a real danger of conflict, for instance, exists 
when a downstream country having a powerful military capability demands a secured and 
uninterrupted flow of water to the detriment of upstream countries with a relatively weak 
military and economic capability.1  
The Nile Basin which is the longest river in the world and inhabited by more than 160 million 
people is living with such conflict potential.2  International watercourse law, as a branch of 
public International Law, has tried to address the issue of equitable access to a common river 







                                                          
1
 S. A Mason, From Conflict to Cooperation in the Nile Basin 15(2004). 
2
 Id. 
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Source: Map Design unit of the World Bank (2000) 
The 1997 Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourse, which took 
27 years to develop, has failed to command the acceptance of some riparian states. The two main 
principles of the Convention, i.e. Art.5 which provides for the “equitable and reasonable 
utilization” and Art.7 which provides for “no significant harm” are being interpreted by riparian 
states from their own point of view. While “equitable and reasonable utilization” is much more 
advocated by upstream countries, the principle of “no significant harm” is advocated by 
downstream countries. The principle of “equitable and reasonable utilization” has become a 
subject of intense controversy when viewed in relation to” historical rights” or “prior 
appropriation” principles relied upon by downstream states. The Nile basin has been 
characterized by such a controversy. 
After the launching of the Nile Basin Initiative in 1999 - a Provisional Cooperative Framework – 
the situation seems to have assumed a different dimension. Now, more than ever before, there is 
a common understanding that water security is more secured through cooperation than 
confrontation. It is increasingly becoming an acknowledged fact that violence over water is not 
“strategically rational, hydrographically effective or economically viable . . .”.3 It is also believed 
that non- cooperation between and among riparian brings about inefficient water resource 
management that could result in decreasing water quantity, quality and fragile environmental.4 
Due to these and other positive considerations, states sharing a common river basin are bound to 
enter into dialogue with one another to effect cooperation. By so doing, they can sustainably 
utilize their common water resource to alleviate poverty and bring about economic development. 
This general pattern of cooperation is also shared by the Eastern Nile Basin states as 
symbolically substantiated by the establishment of the NBI, along with other basin states, which 
aims at forging or catalyzing cooperation that would lead to a with a win-win outcome . 
                                                          
3
 Aaron T. Wolf, UNDP, Conflict and Cooperation over Transboundary Waters 7(2006) 
4
 Id. 
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In the words of Nicol: “the Eastern Nile Countries have moved from an earlier era of bellicose 
assertions of prior, historic rights and national sovereignty over watercourses to a 'Common 
Vision' of developing the Nile that seeks: 'to achieve sustainable socio-economic development 
through the equitable utilization of and benefit from the common Nile Basin water Resources'.5 
To effect this win-win outcome, there emerged a concept of sharing benefits whereby what is 
shared is not the physical water but the bundle of benefits springing from the use of the water 
itself. Successful agreements over international river basins are focusing on marshalling their 
cooperation on the basis of “needs” and interests than mere” rights”.6 The Nile Basin countries 
seem to have embarked on this truck though how successfully they are going to make it workable 
is yet to be seen. 
1.1. Background of the Study 
The Nile Basin comprises ten riparian states [.Burundi, D.R Congo Egypt, Eritrea Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda]. The Nile River traverses for 6700 kilometers 
through the political territories of the riparian states and is the longest international river system 
in the world.7 Of the ten riparian states of the basin some are among the ten poorest countries in 
the world, four are land-locked and are suffering from chronic internal and external conflicts.8  
Harnessing this vital resource for economic development was not an opportunity available to all 
of them save the downstream countries. This state of affair is attributed to the absence of a basin 
wide agreement among all the riparians, to the weak financial capacity and technical know how 
and the internal political instability of many of the upstream riparian states.  
                                                          
5
 Alan Nicol, UNESCO, The Nile: Moving Beyond Cooperation 17(2003) 
6
 Wolf, Supra note 3, at 45 
7
 Ashok Swain, Ethiopia, the Sudan and Egypt: The Nile River Dispute 35 The Journal of Modern African 
States 675, 675(1997) 
8
 W. Clauda Sadoff and David Grey, Beyond the River: The Benefits of Cooperation on International 
Rivers 4 Water Policy 389, 401(2002) 
[THE CONCEPT OF BENEFIT SHARING IN THE 
CONTEXT OF THE EASTERN NILE BASIN] 
 
 
7 CHAPTER ONE- INTRODUCTION |  
 
Of the many water treaties concluded in relation to the basin, the 1929 and 1959 agreements can 
be noted as a classic example of uneven and unjust allocation of the Nile water. By virtue of the 
1929 agreement Egypt was given the authority not only to use the water but also to inspect and 
investigate any control work along the whole length of the Nile. This agreement has also 
allocated the water resource of the basin between Egypt and Sudan to the detriment and 
exclusion of the other riparian states. In a similar fashion the 1959 agreement allotted the whole 
water of the basin between Egypt and Sudan with the lion's share going to Egypt.9  
This bilateral and monopolistic utilization of the common Nile water resource has made other 
upstream countries, most particularly Ethiopia, uncomfortable with the prevailing status quo and 
hegemony. To rectify this imbalance they called for a new agreement that would establish 
equitability of use. Because of this strong move Egypt's argument that the maintenance of the 
status quo is vital for her security interest is highly challenged currently by other riparians.10 
In the Eastern Blue Nile block (Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan) it is Ethiopia which presses hard to 
create equilibrium on the utilization of the water. As many writers concur, Ethiopia which feeds 
about 86% of the Nile water has been kept out of the Nile Waters allocation regime. This state of 
affair has made the interrelation between Egypt and Ethiopia to be marred with suspicion, 
mistrust and even at times threats of war.11  
Ethiopia has now dissociated herself from the "wait and see "game approach and displayed a 
natural interest to utilize the waters of the basin for developmental purposes on the basis of the 
principle of equitable utilization. This stance of Ethiopia is necessitated due to the prevalence of 
a strong desire to address the burning pain of poverty by ensuring food security and promoting 
economic development.  
                                                          
9
 Tesfaye Tafesse, The Nile Question, Hydropolitics, Legal Wrangling, Modus Vivendi and Perspectives 
74(2001) 
10
 Miriam R. Lowi, Water and Conflict in the Middle East and South Asia: Are Environmental and 
Security Issues Linked? 8 The Journal of Environment Development 376, 382(1999) 
11
 Daniel Kindie, Egypt and the hydropolitics of the Blue Nile 6 North East African Studies141 
,157(1999) 
[THE CONCEPT OF BENEFIT SHARING IN THE 
CONTEXT OF THE EASTERN NILE BASIN] 
 
 
8 CHAPTER ONE- INTRODUCTION |  
 
The tug-of-war that used to characterize the hydropolitics of the Nile Basin seems to have 
relaxed after the launching of the NBI (Nile Basin initiative) in 1999. Previous attempts to foster 
cooperation around the basin, HYDROMET (1967-1992), UNDUGU (1983-1993) and 
TECCONILE (1992-1998) didn't bear the desired fruit. In all of these arrangements, Ethiopia 
opted to remain as an observer.12   
A much more meaningful attempt to effect cooperation for mutual development of the Nile Basin 
was brought into life in February 1999 when all the riparians of the Nile have come together for 
a joint discourse with a view to pursue the sustainable development and management of Nile 
waters. In order to effectuate these goals, they have established the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) as 
a transitional arrangement until a permanent cooperative frame work is delivered.13  
The riparian states have come up with a number of what are called "Shared Vision" programs 
with a motto:  
"To achieve sustainable socio-economic development through the equitable utilization of and 
benefit from, the common Nile Basin water resources" 
Although the agreement in sharing the same vision is taken to be a big jump in the right direction 
for riparian states whose relation has been strained for along time, there still exists a big 
challenge ahead in translating this specific vision on the ground.    
1.2             Statement of the Problem 
Basin wide or sub-basin cooperation, as the case may be, offers a wide range of benefits. Sadoff 
and Grey (2002) identified four categories of benefits of cooperation in Transboundary Rivers as 
follows:  
1. 'Benefit to-the-river':- This benefit is linked to improving water quality, river flow 
characteristics, soil conservation, and biodiversity and over-all sustainability.  
                                                          
12
 Yacob Arsano and Imeru Tamrat, Ethiopia and the Eastern Nile Basin 67 Aquatic Science 15, 19(2005) 
13
 Id. 
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2. 'Benefit from the river':- It envisages improved water resources management for 
hydropower and agricultural production, flood-drought management, navigation, 
environmental conservation, water quality improvement and recreation.  
3. 'Benefits because of the river':- It assumes doing away with costs and expenditures 
that are expended for security and military operations which would have been the case if 
cooperation and dialogue was lacking among the riparian members.  
4. Benefits beyond the river: - It imagines the integration of regional infrastructure 
networks along and across the political boundaries of the riparian states and helps 
promote market and free trade14. 
Whichelns et al (2003); tried to put the benefits of cooperation mathematically as follows: 
SNBi= SNBi (FSi, NSi, EGi, QLi, SNBj, Ei) where SNBi denotes social net 
benefits in country i (where i = Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea), FSi is 
food security, NSi is national security, EGi is economic growth, QLi is a 
measure of the quality of life, SNBj denotes social net benefits in other 
countries (j#i) and Ei is a random error term.15 
This formula briefly puts the range of benefits that cooperation may bring about. 
One may further imagine the advantages that can be extracted from cooperation than 
confrontation. However; before riparians commit themselves to cooperation they need to-do-a 
cost-benefit analysis –a shared conclusion that all of the actors of cooperation stand to benefit- a-
win-win scenario. This perception is so important for the sustainability of the cooperation, 
because the greater the perceived benefit the greater the urge to cooperate. In this regard the 
Eastern Nile Basin Countries (Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt) seem to have convinced themselves of 
                                                          
14
 Sadoff and Grey, Supra note 8, at 393 
15
 Dennis Whichelns etal, Cooperation Regarding Water and Other Resources will Enhance Economic 
Development in Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea 19, International Journal of Water Resource 
Development 535, 573-574(2003) 
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the merit of cooperation before they came up with the basin wide shared vision program and a 
subsidiary action program at a sub-basin level.  
The most challenging problem with respect to the Shared Vision Program (SVP) and Subsidiary 
Action Program (Sub-Basin Action Program) is however, to be found in translating the SVP and 
the SAP into practice and thereby effecting distribution of benefits according to a specified 
formula which should prove tasty to all the actors of cooperation. 
The concept of benefit sharing is basically founded on the notion of sharing a wide range of 
benefits that may accrue from developing common water resources than the physical allocation 
of water per se. The scheme of benefit sharing i.e., dealing with the dollar than cubic meters of 
water takes into account the comparative advantage that each riparian state may have in the 
development of common projects in the basin. For instance, due to its geographical location, 
Ethiopia is believed to have a comparative advantage in the development of a hydropower plants, 
Sudan is more suitable for irrigation development while Egypt has a comparative advantage to 
produce high value fruits and vegetables for export to European and Middle Eastern markets.16 
However, the issue of sharing benefits among the riparians of the Nile in the absence of a 
mutually agreed legal regime on the utilization of the Nile waters remains to be one formidable 
challenge.  
Undoubtedly, the scheme of sharing benefits from a common river basin (e.g. Nile) exhibits a 
shift from the existing unilateralism to multilateralism in a common resource development 
thereby fostering a hard to-find-trust and confidence among the riparian states. Benefit sharing 
arrangements are much more attractive than going through the traditional mode of allocating 
water which according to some authors is a zero-sum-game.17  It is further argued that benefit 
                                                          
16
 Mohammed M. Abbas, Towards Hydropolitical Cooperation in the Nile Basin 16(2006); Id, 545,547 
17
 Mark F. Giordano etal, International Resource Conflict and Mitigation 42 Journal of Peace Research 
47, 58(2005); Sadoff and Grey Supra note 8 at 395 
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sharing schemes do have a higher conflict deterring potential over the utilization of the resource 
than the physical allocation of the resource per se.18  
Jos G.Timmerman, argue that the sharing of benefits as one component of the basin wide shared 
vision program highly concentrates on issues of cooperation, where it is possible and feasible, 
despite the presence of differences over legal issue.19 However, as the legal differences in the 
Eastern Nile context are related to the issue of the right to use the water of the Nile as a basis for 
any cooperative engagement, the assumption that benefit sharing arrangement would work with 
out establishing the right over the use of water demand careful examination. Be that as it may 
contemplating new arrangements of use would imply having a fresh look at the status quo. The 
question is do downstream states benefiting from the status quo willing to have a fresh look? 
Assessing the current status of water needs of Egypt Shaden Abdel-Gawad has disclosed that "… 
Egypt has reached a stage where the quality and quantity of water is imposing limits on its 
economic development…".20 Furthermore, according to the National Water Policy of Egypt, 
cooperation with other Nile Basin countries is envisaged with the view to secure additional 
inflow of water to the Lake Nasser or put another way it is envisaged as a strategy to develop 
additional water resource.21 This clearly implies that Egypt is rather intending to find additional 
water to her territory let alone relinquishing her already "secured" inflow of water. This stands in 
contradistinction to what a new arrangement may demand. The reading of some literature written 
by Egyptian scholars seems to demonstrate that any arrangement that would be forthcoming 
should respect the existing status quo ante. Hefny and Amer overtly argue by stating that the 
existing bilateral treaties, which refers to the 1959 water agreement between Egypt and Sudan, 
should have to be considered as having a territorial "character" and as per traditional doctrine and 
                                                          
18
 Id, at 59 
19
 Jos G. Timmerman, Transboundary River Basin Management: The Nile River Case Study 13(2005) 
20
 Shaden Abdel Gawad, Actualizing the Right to water: An Egyptian Perspective for an Action Plan 23 
International Journal of Water Resource Development 341, 342(2007) 
21
 Id, at 347 
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in modern opinion should remain "unaffected by succession of states".22 These same authors 
further claim that such a position is supported by the International Court of Justice.23    
As discussed earlier, Egypt is still living with the traditional conception of adhering to 
"Historical Rights" "Prior Appropriation Theory" and the doctrine of "Territorial Integrity". By 
holding this state of mind, Egypt is willing to enter into cooperative arrangements, be it a scheme 
of water allocation, benefit sharing or both in as much as such an arrangement doesn't impact on 
the existing use.24 
 On the other hand, Ethiopia, which contributes the lion's share of the water to the Nile (86% of 
the total discharge), is still a persistent objector of the status quo. Given these polarized 
positions, the effective realization of the scheme of benefit sharing in the Nile Basin leaves much 
to be desired.  
Ethiopian's passive involvement in the quest for a fair and reasonable share of the water can be 
explained partly to the ideological alignment during the Cold War and partly to lack of financial 
provision and technological know-how to tap the resource. These handicaps have carefully and 
wisely been exploited by Egypt as it allowed her to remain unchallenged as a basin's hegemonic 
power.25 
Now the picture is somehow different. After the end of the cold war, there exists no ideological 
allegiance that fuels the tension between and among the riparian states. Ethiopia claims to have 
the capacity unilaterally and through a bilateral arrangement to pool a resource to finance micro 
hydropower plants and irrigation networks. This newly emerging capacity of Ethiopia coupled 
with an increasing population pressure which necessitated a scheme for sustainable food security 
had made her to be outspoken on issues of equitably using the basin's water resource.  
                                                          
22




 Daniel, supra note 11, at 150. 
25
 Id, at 156 
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Therefore, Egypt should make up her mind that the prevailing status quo on the utilization of the 
water resource of the River Nile can not continue if the ‘Shared Vision Programs’ of the NBI at 
the basin and sub-basin level are to be implemented. From all these discussions, it is apparent 
that a new arrangement that would succeed in accommodating the legitimate interest of all the 
riparians on the utilization of the water of the basin should be crafted if cooperation in whatever 
form should come into effect.  
The difficulty to clearly perceive the quantum of monetary and other benefits by the riparians is 
another real challenge in the context of benefit sharing arrangement. Before states commit 
themselves to engage in cooperation; they need to know how much they are to gain when viewed 
as against their wide range of treaty-based commitments. The way benefits may be apportioned 
from cooperation between and among riparians do have a direct bearing in shaping the nature of 
cooperation for basin wide development-ranging from "… opposition to indifference and [up] to 
enthusiastic support".26 Under such circumstances, if cooperation is to be viable riparians who 
benefited more should compensate those riparians who are at a disadvantage. However; there 
still exists a challenging problem of formulating a compensatory scheme in a situation where the 
extent of gain and loss cannot be ascertained for sure. 27  This shows that harmonization of 
benefits or ensuring a benefit to all riparians would be very difficult for a basin having many 
riparian states like the Nile.28 Therefore, an incentive to cooperation for developing the basin 
would be limited if the distribution of the gains is perceived to be inequitable.29  
The foregoing discussion, therefore, hatches a number of questions: how could a workable 
formula that pays all riparians can be formulated? Does the principle of 'equitable and reasonable 
utilization' of the water resource of the basin as enshrined under Art 5 of the UN Convention on 
                                                          
26
 Timmerman, Supra note 19, at 14 
27
 Jhon Waterbury, Between Unilateralism and Comprehensive Accords: Modest Steps toward 
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Non-Navigational uses of International Water Course (1997) serve as an aiding tool in crafting 
the formula? These and other similar questions would be investigated in the study. 
1.3      Objective of the Study 
The study will have the following objectives.  
1. To explore possible modalities of sharing benefits emanating from the equitable 
utilization of the common Nile water resources, 
2. Examine whether the principle of equitable utilization as envisaged in the 1997 UN 
Convention on the 'Use of the Non- Navigational use of International Watercourses' can 
be of any help in developing the formula.  
3. Probe whether the scheme of sharing benefits before reaching an agreement on the legal 
principles governing the basin would work. 
4. Examine whether there would be a situation where volumetric allocation of water and 
benefit sharing can coexist or are they mutually exclusive. 
1.4      Significance of the Study 
The study findings will have the following significances.  
1. It would to a certain extent   expose the substantive aspect of the concept.  
2. It would provide some options in developing a workable formula for sharing benefits.  
3. It intends to explore challenges in designing workable formula and thereby enable the 
stake holders to identity the problem areas easily so that it would be possible to tackle 
them. 
4. It would catalyze further debate and research on this specific area and ; 
5. It would enrich the already existing literature on the area and would be of some help for 
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     1.5    Scope of the Study  
 Even though the Nile Basin comprises ten riparian states, in order to make the study much more 
manageable the study is limited to the Eastern Nile Basin countries only. Even among the four 
co-basin states belonging to this sub-basin, Eritrea is not considered in the study simply because 
Eritrea is still an observer and as such is not an active participant in the process. Hence, the scope 
of the study is basically framed to examine the concept of benefit sharing in the context of the 
Eastern Nile Basin. By so doing it tries to discuss the concept of benefit sharing, identify 
different scenarios as to how benefits may be shared and discuss practical problems that may 
hinder the realization of benefit sharing schemes.  
 
1.6      Research Methodology and Source of Data 
The study would employ the doctrinal legal research methods – a legal inquiry and analysis into 
the subject of the study. It means, the researcher uses analytical approach though some parts of 
the paper may demand a descriptive approach. The research undertaking will be an arm- chair 
(library) work. In this respect, International water Law Principles, Provisions, NBI documents, 
Books, Journal Articles, Report documents, Research works, International Treaties and other 
relevant materials from libraries and internet sources would be used as an input for the  research. 
Besides, it is envisaged to conduct interview with pertinent stakeholders and experts. 
1.7      Limitations of the Study 
The concept of sharing benefits as opposed to the allocation of water is a new approach of 
cooperation. Because of this reason the hitherto survey of materials on the subject proved to be 
very scanty. In addition, the concept is not extensively tested on the ground. Some experiences 
are bilateral in nature and their implementation in a multilateral context like the Nile Basin is not 
yet fully explored.  
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CHAPTER TWO:  WATER AS A BONE OF CONTENTION  
2.1    Background 
Water is a building block of life.  Human welfare and development is principally water 
dependent. Developmental endeavors are linked to water in many pathways including, food and 
energy, industrial and commercial activities1. It is to be noted that 97% of the world water 
resource is found in oceans making it virtually unfit for drinking, agricultural or industrial 
purposes.  What is left is 1% fresh water that is utilized by six billion inhabitants of the world.  
The figure is more alarming when one compares the rate of consumption of water which is 
double the rate of population growth.2  
The finite nature of this strategic resource on the one hand and the ever growing demand for it, 
owing to the ever growing size of the word population, made the issue of water to be of at most 
importance.  This vitality by its own carries with it a conflict potential. 
There are different schools of thought on the issue of the linkage between water and conflict.  At 
least two major thoughts can be identified-the Realist and Liberal schools of thought. According 
to the Realists school of thought, a resource that is external to a boundary of a given state and 
which is at the same time vital for maintaining a state’s security and survival has a rich potential 
to induce conflict.  It would be more conflictual when an exploitation of a common water 
resource is viewed by the other riparian state as a threatening factor for its survival and security.3   
                                                          
1
 Asit K. Biswas, An Assessment of Future Global water issues, 21 Water Resource Development 229, 
229 (2005)  
2
 Robert O. Collins, Smoothing the Waters, (1999) no. 11 – 2, IGCC Policy Brief at 2  
3
 Paw R. Hensel etal, Conflict Management of Riparian Disputes, 25 Political Geography 383, 348(2006) 
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The Liberal school of thought on the other hand negates conflict over a water resource as it holds 
the view that the international market will neutralize the conflict potential. 4  
As there exists an interface between water and poverty, states lying up or downstream of an 
international river put the issue of access to water at the top of their diplomatic relation with their 
co-riparians.  This scenario is especially true in arid and semiarid regions where the very survival 
of nations depend on the availability of water that finds its origin outside their territory.  This is 
the case in Egypt, Syria and Iraq where they are compelled to balance precariously on the edge 
of scarcity and survival.  For such countries water is a national and security issue and the major 
preoccupation of their foreign policy. 
The question of having a fair share in an international river basin becomes a principal issue when 
one considers the existence of 263 transboundary rivers which claim half of the territory of the 
world and also accommodate half of the population of the world.5  
The scarcity of this vital resource owing to mismanagement, climatic change, environmental 
degradation and the increased per capita withdrawal have made the competition for fresh water 
more acute than ever before. This strong desire to exercise control over the water resource at the 
interstate level brings the issue of sovereignty into the play ground.  The right to exploit ones 
own resource (the territorial water) as a manifestation of sovereignty and the attempt to put a 
limit on it so that it would not impact on the welfare and development endeavors of other states 
around the basin had been and still is the preoccupation of the international watercourse law. 
Lack of a harmonized position between and among states has, thus, made a conflict potential a 
looming threat.   
At already noted, the conflict potential becomes real when riparian states “securitize” the water 
resource by defining an access to given international water the sole and irreplaceable source of 
                                                          
4
 Q. K. Ahmad, Towards Poverty Alleviation: The Water Sector Perspectives, 19 Water Resource 
Development 263, 264 (2003) 
5
 Muhammed Mizanur Rahaman and Oill Varies, The Mexico World Water Forum’s Ministerial 
Declaration, 24 Water Resource Development 177, 187(2006) 
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their very survival.  Such “securitization” of water acts as an inhibiting factor for cooperation 
and would put a threat defense sequence in place.6  
 Securitization of an access to water resource is coming to the fore in the post- Cold -War 
political landscape when the very concept of security is getting transformed. In this regard, two 
different conceptions of security have emerged propounded by two thoughts.  The ‘Traditionalist 
View’ of security takes military might as a means to maintain security and discriminates non-
military concerns like environmental sustainability as subsidiary issue. Ultimately, this view has 
boiled down to the issue of the study of the “...threat, use and control of military force.”7  The 
Traditionalist view defines security issues to be an exclusive concern of a given state and 
considers collective arrangement to be irrelevant.8 Accordingly, this view denies the regional or 
international character of environmental issues and its association with regional and international 
remedies.9    
On the other hand, Non-Traditionalist view of security negates the hierarchy that military issues 
should take precedence over other elements of security concern and argue that security concerns 
should put to its fold a variety of threats faced by nations.  Of different varieties of security 
issues deficiency and degradation of natural resources with its uneven distribution, it is hold, 
should be considered as an element of security component.  The Non-Traditionalist view takes 
cognizance of the regional and global components of security and emphasizes that managing and 
resolving environmental problems essentially demand joint efforts.  The Non-Traditionalist view 
bases its strong argument on the ground that environmental change and resource scarcities can 
                                                          
6
 Beatrice Mosello, Water in Centeral Asia: A prospect of conflict or cooperation: available at 
http://www.princeton,edu/∼jpia/pdto8/mosello%zochapter% 209 pdt, at 154-156 (Accessed on Sept. 1, 
2008)   
7
 Shlomi Dinar, Water Security, Conflict and Cooperation, XXII SAIS Review 229, 230(2002) 
8
 Id, at 231 
9
  Id. 
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eventually lead to "... economic decline, social turmoil, disputes, or forced migration which may 
in turn lead to instability, violence and even armed conflict."10   
Thus, the Traditionalist view of security which is military oriented and state centric is criticized 
for its failure to accommodate other public policy goals which potentially underlie the very fact 
that environmental problems are not amenable to military solutions, as opposed to dialogue and 
cooperation.11 From such standpoint, it may be argued that the issue of and access to freshwater 
in arid and semi-arid regions may be of security concern for water scarce countries.  This is 
especially true in the Middle East and North Africa.  The real challenge in this regard is not the 
issue of "securitizing" water but the modality chosen to address the security problem.  The 
Traditionalist View which is military- centric takes military might as a solution to solve water or 
resource scarcity problems. This stance is against international law that prohibits resort to force 
as a means of settling inter-state disputes.  Hence, hydrological brinkmanship is not a right tool 
to remedy scarcity problems as it would rather exacerbate the situation from bad to worse. In this 
context Shimon Peres had the following to say:  
...Wars fought over water do not solve anything.  Gunfire will not drill wells to irrigate the 
thirsty land, and after the dust has settled, the original problem remains.  No war can change 
geographical givens.12   
In the face of the "securitization" of water, the attempt for mutual development of the common 
water resource for the common good would become politically risky and the bid to forge 
cooperation would also become complex.  Desecuritaization of transboundary water is, thus, a 
decisive step on the way to forge cooperative framework as cooperation over water is a brick and 
mortar for mutual development. 
                                                          
10
 Id, at 231 – 232  
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 Id.   
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 Mosfafa Dolatyar and Tims S. Gray, The Politics of water Scarcity in the Middle East, 9 Environmental 
Politics 65, 76(2000)   
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The ever escalating disparity between the demand and supply side of water has also aroused 
different impressions about its role in fomenting conflict.  It is routinely projected by pessimists 
that future wars would be fought over water.  Abundant literatures on conflict oftentimes refer to 
the speech by the then Egyptian Foreign Minister, Butros-Butros Ghali, the Egyptian President, 
Anwar Sadat and Ismail Serageldin a one time Vice President of the World Bank (also an 
Egyptian).They all said that future wars would be fought over the issue of access to water.13   On 
the other hand, there are optimists that reject the water war thesis holding a view that "...water is 
too vital a resource to be put at risk by war".14 The advocates of such a position also known as 
Liberal Functionalists argue against the doom-laden prophecies that water is rather a factor that 
nurtures cooperation and oil that lubricates regional cooperation.15   
Aaron Wolf (1998) raises three solid arguments against the water war thesis.  These are 
strategic, shared interest and economic arguments.  In explaining the strategic argument he 
emphasizes the fact that destroying the dam or any other water quantity control structure would 
subject the attacking downstream state to flood and water quality problems.  Arguing on the 
shared interest pillar he held the view that the attack would deny the downstream states the 
benefits of using the out of flow water for its irrigated agriculture and water transportation 
system.  Arguing on the economic consideration, a point is made by the same author on the very 
expensive nature of a full scale warfare that intends to depopulate and occupy the head water.16  
Wolf went further to establish the irrationality of water wars by quoting the Israeli defense force 
analyst who is quoted to have said:  
                                                          
13
 Hussien A. Amery, Water Wars in the Middle East: A Looming Threat, 169 The Geographical Journal 
313, 314(2000)  
14
 Dolatyar and Gray, Supra note 12, at 67.   
15
 Jan Selby, The Geopolitics of Water in the Middle East: Fantasies and Realities, 26 Third World 
Quarterly 329, 330(2005) 
16
 Aaron T. Wolf, Conflict and Cooperation over International Freshwater resources: Indicators of 
Basins at Risk, Journal of American Water Resources Association 1109, 1112(2003) 
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Why go to war over water, for the price of one week's fighting, you could build five 
desalination plants.  No loss of lift, no international pressure and a reliable supply you don't 
have to defend in hostile territory.17    
The different perceptions on the issue of water wars necessitate navigating through historical 
records to establish whether or not war had been fought over access to water.  The attempt to 
seek answers for such questions reveals two opposing views.  There are some evidences which 
illustrate that wars were fought over water.  History had recorded a true "water war" 4500 years 
back between the city states of Lagash and Umma on the Tigris-Euphrates basin.18 The exchange 
of fire between Israel and Syria, over Israeli water development project in the Huleh Basin 
between 1951and1953, another skirmish between the same parties over the "All Arab 
Plan"between1965and 1966 to divert the Jordan River headwaters and the conflict between Syria 
and Iraq in 1975 over the latter's claim that Syria was not allowing the discharge of enough water 
to reach downstream Iraq are some of the incidents that lent support to the water-war link 
thesis.19  The 1967 Arab-Israel war is believed to find its genesis from the diversion of the Jordan 
head water.  Ariel Sharon is quoted to have said that: 
People generally regard 5th June 1967 as the day [when] the six-day war began, that is the 
official date. But, in reality, it started two and half years earlier, on the day Israelis decided to 
act against the diversion of the Jordan [River].20  
 There is also an allegation that the 1992 invasion of Lebanon by Israel was motivated with 
prime intent to ensure water security from the Litani River.21   Beyond being the cause of war 
per se the issue of access to water was put on the equation to re-arrange territorial compromises 
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 Id, at 261   
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 Aaron T. Wolf, Transboundary Waters: Sharing Benefits, Lessons Learned, Paper Presented on 
International Conference on Fresh Water, Bonn 2001, at 8   
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 Dinar, Supra note 7, at 234 – 235   
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on the Golan Height between Syria and Israel. 22   A number of disagreements that led to 
militarized conflicts notably between Israel, Syria and Jordan in the 1950s and 1960s are water- 
induced; more particularly associated with attempts to divert water from the Jordan and 
Yarmouk Rivers.23   
It should, nevertheless, be noted that in spite of such conflictual situations empirical evidences 
overwhelmingly reveal that cooperation over water outweighs conflicts as evidenced by the 
signing of many treaties over water.  The study by Yoffe etal(2003) displayed that out of 1831 
events 507 of them (28 percent) were conflictive and 1128 (67 percent) were cooperative, while 
the remaining 5 percent were neutral or non-significant events.24  
The argument that water is so vital a resource that should not to be a subject of war and violence 
can be demonstrated through a number of instances.  Water agreements have been negotiated and 
signed even between vociferous enemies.  The 1960 Indus water Treaty and its institution, 
mainly the Indus River Commission, survived and continued to operate in the face of war and 
conflict between India and Pakistan.  The Mekong Committee of the Mekong River Basin was 
engaged in facilitating cooperation through the exchange of data since its establishment in 1957 
even during the times of the cold war.  Israel and Jordan were in the course of ‘Picnic table 
negotiation’ since 1953 up until the Signing of the 1994 Peace Treaty which included access to 
water as one component of the Peace Treaty.25  
The prevalence of cooperative treaties over conflictual events demonstrates that cooperation is 
water rational.  The other disincentive that may validly be accountable for transboundary riparian 
states to opt for cooperation is the fact that violence does not sustainably guarantee access to 
water.  First and foremost invasion and occupation is against the core principle of international 
law that outlaws any form of aggression under whatever reason it may be conducted.  Secondly, 
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an invading force can not indefinitely occupy a sovereign state in the contemporary world 
politics.  
In general, the issue of access to water represents dual scenarios. One is a conflict scenario where 
access is considered a national security and because of such characterization states are 
committed to secure access through military means.  The second one is cooperative scenario 
where dialogue and cooperation to ensure access is sustainably advocated.  This scenario does 
actually admit a conflict potential but deny its inevitability through negotiated treaties and the 
establishment of joint river management institutions.26 Such arrangements have been in place as 
a neutralizing element of potential conflict in the Danube and the Rhine Basins for decades.27  
The empirical studies conducted on the basis of water treaties and the currently prevailing 
patterns of cooperative endeavors among riparian states seem to refute some of the prophecies 
that ‘the future war would be fought over water’.         
2.2  The Eastern Nile Context  
The Eastern Nile Basin that comprises, Ethiopia Egypt and Sudan is a hydropolitically important 
segment of the entire basin at least for three major reasons.  First, this sub basin is the hotspot 
which carries with its embryo the conflict potential when viewed in relative terms with its 
equivalent sub-basin (Nile Equatorial Lakes Sub-basin).  Such a conflict potential emerges from 
the characterization of access to the waters of the Nile as a security issue by Egypt and the strong 
and unswerving commitments of Ethiopia to tap the water resource of the Nile for its badly 
needed poverty alleviation and food security programs.  It is in effect the confrontation between 
existing use and contemplated new uses. Secondly, 86% of the overall water contribution to the 
basin finds its origin from this sub-basin, particularly from Ethiopia.  Thirdly, the historical 
treaties on the management and utilization of the Nile River waters that totally denied any share 
to the major contributor of the water i.e., Ethiopia exist in this same sub-basin.  Because of these 
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hydropolitical intricacies, this sub- basin has been a serious bone of contention between upstream 
and downstream countries, most notably between Ethiopia and Egypt as the major provider and 
recipient of the Nile waters respectively. The midstream country i.e., Sudan is a moderate 
beneficiary of the Nile waters. Due to its imagined political strategic and economic benefits from 
both countries, Sudan has been in a state of dilemma as to where to align her in the 
hydropolitical confrontation. 28   Therefore; the major hydropolitical hullabaloo is in effect 
reduced into confrontation between Ethiopia and Egypt.  These two countries advocate distinct 
principles of International Water Law to vindicate their positions and to establish access to the 
Nile waters.  Egypt fights hard to maintain the status quo and tries to seal off any gateway to the 
water resource to a ‘new comer’ such as Ethiopia. 
The conflict potential in the Eastern Nile Basin is, therefore, keenly observed by the international 
community, as any conflict over the Nile water would trigger and exacerbate the existing and 
potential conflicts in the Greater Horn of Africa.  
The fact that the Nile is the carotid artery to Egypt is acknowledged from the time of the 
Pharaohs to contemporary Presidents and from the technocrat to the ordinary peasant.  Egypt is 
made to be an “oasis in the desert” owing to the flow of the Nile Water.  Without the cascade of 
the Nile water, Egypt would have “…consisted of only sand and rock and wind.”29  Because of 
this reason, Egyptians, throughout the millennia are taken hostage by the paranoia that the flow 
of the river would one day in the future be interfered with by developmental activities of an 
upstream country especially Ethiopia and by  drought that could impact on  the level of water 
reaching Egypt.30  
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  For the detailed analysis of the factors that gave rise to the dilemma, see Tesfaye Tafesse, The Nile 
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In order to offset this paranoia Egypt has left no stone unturned.  They have utilized any 
conceivable political and diplomatic clout to keep the status quo ante intact.  This stance of 
Egypt is succinctly explained by an observer of the Nile hydropolitics: 
Egypt is a country that has not abandoned its expansionist ambitions.  It regards its southern 
neighbor as its sphere of influence.  Its strategy is essentially negative:  to prevent the 
emergence of any force that could challenge its hegemony and to thwart any economic 
development along the banks of the Nile that could either divert the flow of the water or 
decrease its volume.  The arithmetic of the waters of the Blue Nile River is, therefore, a zero 
sum game, which Egypt is determined to win.  It must have a hegemonic relationship with the 
countries of the Nile valley and the Horn of Africa.  When, for instance, Ethiopia is weak and 
internally divided, Egypt can rest.  But, when Ethiopia is prosperous and self confident, 
playing a leading role in the region, Egypt is worried.31  
Based on this misconceived strategy, Egypt has conducted overt and covert acts against the 
interest of Ethiopia from ancient to modern times. The Egyptian occupation of Metemma, 
Massawa, Kunama, and Harar in 1838, 1846, 1869 and 1875, respectively, are some noteworthy 
aggressive and overt acts of war.32  The ever growing aspiration of Egypt to control the source of 
the Nile water reached its zenith when she undertook a military expedition against the territorial 
integrity and political independence of Ethiopia by provoking a battle at Gundet in 1975 and at 
Gura in 1876, losing both of them bitterly.33   
After the military bids to control the source and flow of the Nile collapsed, Egypt resorted to 
diplomatic and covert war fronts. By so doing she succeeded in blocking Ethiopia access to loans 
from the World Bank to tap the agricultural and hydropower potentials of the Blue Nile.  She has 
also extensively exploited the World Bank Operative Directive [OD7.50] which demands the 
prior agreement of the concerned riparian states before a fund is advanced for a water control 
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work project.  This financial blockade was facilitated due to the presence of Egyptian 
professionals within the Bank leading crucial departments in areas of environment and 
international law.34  
Parallel to this diplomatic fight, Egypt was implicated in organizing, training and hosting 
Eritrean succession movement forces and leaders to upgrade the scale of the civil war and 
thereby destabilize Ethiopia.35 Daniel equivocally presented such state of affairs as: 
...by promoting the Eritrean insurrection, Egypt made sure that Ethiopia would divert both its 
efforts and its resources into quelling the Eritrean uprising-resources which would have been 
utilized in tapping the waters of the Blue Nile for developmental purposes. By providing the 
necessary military, ideological, political and diplomatic support for the insurrection, Egypt 
effectively undermined Ethiopia36     
Egypt’s plan to play the “Water for Peace” game after the 1979 Israel-Egypt peace Treaty was 
also another source of tension between Ethiopia and Egypt.  This idea of transferring the Nile 
Water out of its catchment area into Israel was bitterly opposed by Ethiopia.  Such opposition 
was not limited to the out of basin transfer of the Nile water but also to its diversion plan to the 
so called ‘new lands’ in the western corner of the Nile Delta. In return to this plan, Ethiopia 
threatened to tamper with the volume of the Nile water that would reach Egypt.37   
Generally speaking, Egypt’s strident attempt to address the issue of water scarcity began to take 
root after independence when in 1952 President Gamal Abdul Nasser initiated a project to 
construct a High Dam at Aswan38 and after the return of the Suez Canal back to Egypt in 195639. 
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Because of this grave dependence on the Nile River water, Egypt’s foreign policy is to a greater 
extent shaped by the hydro politics of the Nile in general and by the Blue Nile in particular.40     
The hydropolitical antagonism between Egypt and Sudan, though not as loud as the case between 
Ethiopia and Egypt, is not problem- free.  Sudan enjoys the relative fair share of the water, but 
still harbors a strong desire to have a far better share than the one apportioned to her under the 
1959 bilateral agreement over the allocation of the Nile water.  This stance of Sudan was 
dormant throughout Jaafar Nimeiris regime because of his amiable relation with Egypt.  He had 
survived some political turmoil in 1971 and in 1976 because of Egypt’s military rescue 
operation. This was reciprocated by the permission given to Egypt to jointly construct the water 
control structure at Jonglei, a project which had to be halted because of the military operations 
by the southern Sudanese rebels.  While such political alliance was at its height the two countries 
signed a deal in 1970, 1974 and 1982 to keep the Nile valley as a single unit.41    
Such an earnest diplomatic and political alliance, however, had not survived the time after the 
coup d’état that ousted president Nimeiri out of office in 1985.  The relation between the two 
countries became much more strained because of the growing aspiration of Sudan to have the 
1959 water agreement revisited which Egypt categorically opposes and the advent of political 
islamization in Sudan by the National Islamic Front (NIF) of Hassen-Al-Turabi.  As an insult on 
injury, the implication of Sudan behind the assassination attempt of the Egyptian President, 
Houssni Mubarok in Addis Ababa in June, 1955 negatively impacted the prevailing poor 
relationship.42 The tension escalated further when Hassen-Al-Turabi of NIF threatened to stop 
Egypt’s supply of water by re-directing the course of the flow of the Nile water .Al-Turabi’s 
threat was responded aggressively by the Egyptian president where he was quoted to have said 
that “Those who play with fire in Khartoum...will push us to confrontation and to defend our 
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rights and lives”43  In a similar tone, the Foreign Minister of Egypt was quoted as saying “I am 
warning Turabi not to play with fire, at the same time not to play with water”44  
In sum; the hydropolitics of the Eastern Nile Basin was characterized by the prevalence of 
mistrust, and suspicion, and in the case of Egypt with a strong drive to protect the status quo ante 
with every conceivable and possible means within her reach.  Such uncooperative mood will 
remain to color the basin unless and until Egypt moves from “...a threatening ‘old school’ to a 
more cooperative ‘new school’”45   
 2.3  Brief Overview of Water Treaties and their Implication to the 
Prevailing Status Quo   
The Nile basin is characterized by lack of a basin wide accord that adjudicates the interest of all 
basin states in relation to the utilization of the Nile waters. The quest for such an accord is facing 
an enormous challenge by the position taken by downstream states to the effect that bilateral 
agreements on the Nile water utilization should remain intact. The following discussion will treat 
the essence of these bilateral treaties and their implication to the whole effort of framing a 
permanent cooperative legal framework as a basis for a benefit sharing arrangement. 
2.3.1 The 1929 Water Treaty 
The legal regime to share and allocate the waters of the Nile waters of the Nile River started in 
1929 by a Treaty signed between Egypt and Great Britain, representing the Nile riparian 
countries under its colonial administration, i.e., Sudan, Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda.  The other 
agreements that preceded the 1929 agreement did not provide for a water sharing arrangement 
than prescribing for a duty not to interfere with the natural flow of Nile River.  In this regard, the 
1891 agreement between Italy and Britain, the 1902 agreement between Ethiopia and Britain, the 
1906 agreement between Britain and Congo [it is actually Belgium that did actually sign the 
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treaty] from carrying out any water related construction works that would have the effect of 
tampering with the flow and volume of water reaching Sudan and Egypt. 46   All these 
arrangements were designed to serve first the interest of the colonial power, Britain, and after 
independence that of Egypt and Sudan.47  
The 1929 Water Treaty mainly targeted the water demand of Egypt, though Sudan’s right to use 
the water was recognized to the extent that it does not threaten the interest of Egypt.  The legal 
significance of this Treaty was that, first it puts a restraint on Britain not to interfere with the 
natural flow of the Nile water that ends up in Egypt. Secondly, any water related works to be 
carried out by Sudan are to be administered by Egypt.  Thirdly, the Treaty empowered Egypt to 
monitor the construction of the Sennar Dam in Sudan to ensure that water regulation is carried 
out in line with the agreement.48  
In terms of water allocation, The 1929 Treaty earmarked 48BMC and 4BMC to Egypt and 
Sudan, respectively, leaving approximately 32BMC unallocated. Apart from the 48BMC of 
water per annum, Egypt also secured the whole timely flow of the Nile River from January 20 to 
July 15, which in effect puts Sudan under the duty not to cultivate cotton during such dry 
seasons.49     
Nonetheless, 30 years later the 1929 water agreement had to go through transformation because 
Sudan, the less beneficiary of the deal started complaining after attaining her independence on 
the ground that the Treaty unfairly allocated much of the water to Egypt and the agreement was 
signed by a colonial power not by the legitimate representative of Sudan.50  The other point cited 
for the repudiation of the 1929 Water Treaty was the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus, which 
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allows a party to rescind a treaty on account of a material change of circumstances.  In this 
regard, Sudan argued that its attainment of independence amounted to a vital material change of 
circumstances allowing her not to be bound by the treaty provisions.51  
The demand for the revision of the 1929 Water Agreement by Sudan was raised at a time when 
Egypt was contemplating to build a huge dam at Aswan as a possible device to address what she 
calls water security problem.  As it was very difficult for Egypt to insist on refusing the revision 
and at the same time running the idea of constructing the dam whose reservoir would extend into 
Sudan’s territory the 1959 Water Agreement was born.52  When Sudan decided to sign the 1959 
Water Agreement, she had to recognize some elements of the 1929 Water Agreement, especially 
the established right of Egypt’s share of the water as it was allocated under the 1929 Water 
Treaty.  Thus, one can hold a view that the 1959 Water Agreement is to a certain extent an 
offshoot of the 1929 Water Agreement. 
2.3.2 The 1959 Water Treaty 
This Agreement claims to make the whole volume of the Nile Water to be the subject of 
allocation as the title “Agreement for the full utilization of the Nile water” implies such a 
holding.  
The reference of the allocation is the annual average flow of the Nile as measured at Aswan, 
which is 84BCM.  Egypt was allocated 55.5BCM while Sudan was to utilize 18.5BCM leaving 
the rest i.e. 10BCM, for seepage and evaporation.  This treaty has upgraded the ratio of Sudan-
Egypt Share from 1:12 in the 1929 Agreement to 1:13.53 The other peculiar element of the 1959 
Agreement is its inclusion of an article that provides a possible revision of the allocation if other 
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up stream riparian countries with a stake on the Nile are to raise a claim. This Treaty has also 
allowed Sudan not only to construct the reservoir at Rosseirs but also any other water control 
works that puts her in a better position to make effective utilization of its water share.54 Egypt 
has also encouraged the construction of water control works in Sudan as it could act as a 
"Siltation basin" which could arrest considerable amount of silt from reaching Lake Nasser.  
Egypt has also not been tolerant but also supported Sudan to generate hydropower because such 
scheme doesn't affect the flow of the Nile.55  
When viewed in contradistinction to the 1929 Water Agreement, the 1959 Water Treaty as a 
bilateral cooperative framework had demonstrated a fair share of the Nile Water between the two 
signatories.  The construction of the Aswan High Dam, which is the byproduct of this Treaty, 
had somehow calmed down the voracious appetite of Egypt for the Nile Water, as it provided her 
with a level of year to year water security.  This Treaty had also institutionalized the bilateral 
relation through the establishment of a Permanent Joint Technical Committee to facilitate 
cooperation and to resolve disputes. To this effect, a Protocol to establish such a committee had 
also been signed in 1960. 
This Treaty, though modestly contributed to address some misgivings between the two 
signatories, is still a point of contention in the hydropolitics of the sub-basin. Following is the 
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TABLE 0-1 Historical Agreements Over the Nile Water
Source: Allan Nicol (2003) quoting S. Ahmed in: Howell and Allan, 1994  
2.4   The Implication of the Treaties on the 
The cardinal problem of both Treaties is the exclusion of Ethiopia from the deal.  This state of 
affairs left the sub-basin with no multilateral legal regime to the management and utilization of 
the Nile Water.  Both Treaties denied Ethiopia her natural an
common water resource, reducing her to a mere on looker. Both treaties provided Egypt and 
Sudan the basis to argue that they have historic or established rights to continue using the Nile 
Waters as per the allocation made thr
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Egypt which is relentlessly arguing by stating that the right established under the 1959 
Agreement is sacrosanct and fait a compli.   
The stalemate over the distribution of water of the Nile is directly linked to the basic question: 
should Ethiopia which is a major contributor of the water, remain a mere on- looker as had been 
the case almost for the last half a century?  Or should it take actions to uphold its own natural 
and legitimate right?  Is the argument by Egypt to the effect of maintaining the status quo on the 
basis of historical rights, prior use and acquired rights compatible with the currently operating 
International water Law rules of “No significant  harm” and “Equitable and Reasonable 
Utilization”?.  These are some of the basic questions that need careful examination to understand 
and untie the hydropolitical standoff characterized by the quest for striking the balance between 
maintaining and revisiting the status quo.  
The hullaballoo, especially between Ethiopia and Egypt, is an old age problem.  History had 
recorded that in 1133 the Ethiopian king Lalibella entertained the idea of diverting the Nile 
River, which he later refrained to do so upon learning that the Egyptians had agreed to pay an 
annual tribute to him.56   Since the Nile Water is a question of survival and development for both 
countries it can not escape to be a sticking point.   
As noted above, even though the two Water Treaties were signed to the exclusive interest of the 
engaged parties, Ethiopia had made her position clear through an Aide Memoire addressed to the 
diplomatic community in Cairo by saying eloquently that: 
Ethiopia has the right and obligation to exploit its water resources for the benefit of present 
and future generations of its citizens [and] must therefore, reassert and reserve now and for 
the future, the right to take all such measures in respect of its water resources.57    
By being so explicit, as A. Wolf stated, Ethiopia is the only country of the basin to put a clear 
claim over the water that was lately allocated between Egypt and Sudan.58  
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A much more clearly worded position had been reiterated by Emperor Haileselassie of Ethiopia 
in 1957.  It runs: 
We have already explained that plans are under construction to utilize our rivers as an 
essential step in the development of agriculture and industry. It is of paramount importance to 
Ethiopia, a problem of the first order that the waters of the Nile be made to serve the lives and 
needs of our (beloved) people now living and those who will follow us in centuries to come.  
However; generally Ethiopia may be prepared to share this tremendous (God-given) wealth of 
hers with friendly nations neighboring upon her, for the life and welfare of her people.  It is 
Ethiopia’s sacred duty to develop the great watershed which she possesses in the interest of her 
own rapidly expanding population and economy.  To fulfill this task, we have arranged for the 
problem to be studied in all its aspects by experts in the field.  Ethiopia has time and again set 
this forth as her position regarding the utilization of the Nile Waters.  (Ethiopian Observer, 
Jan.1958).59   
As has been clearly illuminated from the speech of the Emperor, Ethiopia had not only accented 
her natural and legitimate claims to the Nile Waters but also displayed her consideration for 
other downstream riparians to have a fair share over the water resource.  Ethiopia’s hydro- 
solidarity stance for mutual use of the water is to be praised as it was declared before any soft 
and formal International Convention on the subject had been formulated.  In a direct contrast to 
Ethiopia’s position Egypt has continued promoting a stance by which she remains the basin’s 
hegemonic power.   The request to have a fresh look at the 1959 Nile  Water Agreement was all 
along been dissented by Egypt on the ground that it would invalidate her historic or acquired 
right over the water.  Egypt would sit around the negotiation table if and only if it is assured that 
the status quo on the utilization of the water as stipulated in the 1959 Agreement is honored.  For 
Egypt, the 1959 Agreement is a sacrosanct document.   In this connection, the statement by 
Aziza M. Fahmi is noteworthy:  
The reallocation of water may be accepted by some jurists, but states will be reluctant to accept 
that principle. A state that has built its economy, indeed maybe its very existence on the waters 
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of a common river, will hardly accept a reassessment of the waters of that river. The principle 
of safeguarding existing rights has been recognized by international treaties.60   
Fahmi seems to have missed the very focal point that a prior treaty based arrangement on the 
allocation of water which is manifestly unfair defies not only logic and natural sense of justice 
but also widely accepted rules of International Water Law.  Such self-centered position renders 
the utilization of the common Nile water resources unsustainable and would fan out the 
hydropolitical crises of the basin.  As it would be discussed in due course in this study, the 
‘Principle of Acquired or Established Right’ as a rule of Customary International Law would 
make sense if it is also harmonized with the ‘Principle of Equitable and Reasonable Utilization’, 
which is also a rule of Customary International Law.  It is against an ordinary intelligence to 
stick to a bilateral treaty arrangement in a basin encompassing ten riparian states.  The problem 
becomes all the more acute when the Treaty arrangement denies a riparian state which 
contributes the bulk of the flow from its catchment area like Ethiopia.  The hydropolitical 
scenario of the basin as currently influenced by the 1959 Water Agreement is best described by 
Tesfaye .He stated: 
The 1959 Agreement created a watershed in the hydro political history of the Nile Valley in the 
sense that it invigorated a monopoly on the waters of the Nile by Egypt and Sudan.  By 
implication ,the Agreement has literally setup a Zero-sum game in the Nile Basin by ignoring 
the natural and legal rights of the remaining seven riparian [now eight] states to the bounty of 
the Nile Water resources.61  
In this connection, it is vital to note the fact that Egypt considers discussion on the possible 
reallocation issue provided that such a discussion should only refers to that portion of the water 
not yet apportioned.62 The Former Egyptian Ambassador to Ethiopia aired the same argument by 
holding that the water demand for common projects under the umbrella of the NBI will be 
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extracted from Sobat, Atbara, and the Blue Nile which doesn’t as yet compose the 85% water 
discharge.63  Kinfe commented on this by saying that such a position would entitle the cream of 
the Nile to Egypt while leaving the other riparians to fight over what is remaining.64  Egypt’s 
characterization of the 1959 water Agreement as a sacred document is attributed to the fact that 
an access to the Nile Water is taken to be of great security concern.  Such “securitization” had 
impeded the quest to reach at distributive justice among the riparians of the sub-basin.  
The argument to maintain the status quo by Egypt discerns an inherent contradiction.  In the 
1959 water Agreement, the signatories have committed themselves to reconsider the arithmetic 
of the allocation regime if a claim of a share from other upstream riparians would arise.  Ethiopia 
not only rejected the bilateral deal but also demanded that a fair distributive justice be made on 
the debris of the 1959 Water Agreement.  Such a demand by Ethiopia has not as yet been 
entertained.  This situation leads to a legitimate question as to why Egypt is insisting that others 
adhere to the terms and conditions of the 1959 agreement while at the same time she failed to 
honor the revision claim of the same agreement.  This is a double standard that Ethiopia would 
find very difficult to accept. 
With the view to secure a probable better share of the Nile Waters, Sudan urges for the revision 
of the Agreement, though such an effort is strongly resisted by Egypt.  In a reaction to such 
resistance, Sudan had, throughout the 1990s threatened to withhold the flow of the Nile Waters 
from reaching Egypt.65  However, it is not clear whether the question of revision that Sudan 
advocates is bilateral or multilateral in nature.  Advocating for a multilateral engagement seems 
to be improbable as it would bring Ethiopia into the picture with a significant claim, which 
would somehow impact the quantum of the share that Sudan may anticipate.  Such a perception 
makes sense when one considers the fact that Sudan’s call for revisiting the status quo is not as 
loud and vocal as has been the case with Ethiopia. 
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To conclude, the 1959 Water Agreement has an immense implication to the hydropolitical 
impasse that the sub-basin finds itself. The Agreement has provided Egypt with an escape route 
from a possible multilateral engagement to craft an all inclusive legal regime on the Nile Water 
and therefore, with a living hope to maintain the status quo for generations to come. 
2.5   International Water Law Doctrines and Principles on the Utilization 
of Transboundary Water 
Water flows through its natural course irrespective of political boundaries .Because of this reason 
a transboundary river is sometimes called a “fugitive resource”.  The moment water crosses 
political boundaries it automatically ignites issues of sovereignty over its management and 
utilization.  The interstate link brought about by the flow of water, thus calls for the operation of 
International Water Law to harmonize the competitive claims over this finite and vital resource.  
The competition over this indispensable resource is becoming fierce as the aquatic ecosystem in 
the world is deteriorating from time to time.  The contemporary world plagued and preoccupied 
by political and financial challenges has denied a deserving attention to the fragile aquatic 
ecosystem.66  This environmental problem is a plus on the “old problem” where a billion people 
are denied access to a water supply and three billion people are without adequate sanitation 
because of water scarcity.67  
The necessity to legally regulate water stems from at least three basic considerations, namely the 
interstate character of international river basins, the effect that water management brings upon 
human rights and other principles of international law and the hydrological cycle that 
internationalizes national water resource causing transboundary effects.68   
Demographic and economic changes that had created a tremendous strain in the available water 
resources have made the operation of International Water Law much more relevant than ever 
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before.  Because of the prevailing disequilibrium between the supply and demand equations, 
access to water had become a security issue in water-scarce countries, most notably in the 
Middle East and North Africa.  Due to this characterization, water is now considered to be a 
potential for conflict and a catalyst for cooperation.  In transforming the conflict potential into a 
cooperative potential, International Water Law is supposed to play a crucial role.69   
In order to establish a dependable access to this scarce commodity, different theories of 
international law have been developed.70 Such theories or principles have been advanced to 
safeguard either the interests of downstream or upstream states.  Of late, a common ground 
thinking accommodating both interests had taken root. In what follows, four theories or 
principles will be discussed. 
2.5.1 Theory of Absolute Territorial Sovereignty (The Harmon Doctrine)  
The cardinal concept of this theory is geared towards safeguarding the unlimited water 
exploitation of the upstream state even to the prejudice of the lower riparian states.  The genesis 
of this theory is the legal opinion of the US Attorney General, Judson Harmon given in 1895.  In 
this case, the US diverted water from the River Rio Grande for irrigation purpose to the 
detriment of the downstream country, Mexico.  In response to Mexico’s complaint over the 
diversion, Harmon advised his government to the effect that “the rules, principles and precedents 
of International Law impose no liability or obligation upon the United States” and went on to 
conclude that the complaint of Mexico is “entirely inconsistent with the sovereignty of the 
United States over its national domain’.71  
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This doctrine is championed by upstream riparians as it purports to deny any claim of the water 
by the downstream riparians as of a legal right.  Because of this reason, the Absolute Territorial 
Sovereignty doctrine denies the international character of an international river and as such 
disclaims any responsibility for any downstream impairment or harm.  Because of its self -
centric nature, the doctrine had suffered serious criticism and was discredited by subsequent 
decisions of international tribunals and writings of scholars on the field.72 Surprisingly, this 
theory failed to settle the issue for which it was created as the dispute between the US and 
Mexico had been resolved on the basis of equitability.73  Since this theory is a source of a 
problem than being part of a solution, it is considered as “anachronism in today’s interdependent 
and water scarce world.74   
2.5.2   Theory of Absolute Territorial Integrity (Riparian Right) 
This theory falls at the other end of the Harmon Doctrine.  Its preoccupation is to ensure the 
uninterrupted and undiminished flow of water from its origin upstream to the downstream.  It 
denies any conceivable right of the upstream riparian and veto any water related developmental 
endeavors that in any way impacts the natural flow and volume of the water reaching 
downstream.  Since the theory endorses the interest of downstream riparians, it is championed 
and invoked by some countries like Egypt, Argentina, Bangladesh, Syria and Iraq against their 
respective riparians.  Because it tampers with the sovereign right of upstream riparians to use 
their natural resource that lies within their sovereign territory, it is colored with the spirit of 
egoism.  Like the Harmon Doctrine, this theory has also negated the international character of 
the transboundary water.  In effect, this theory protects “existing use or prior appropriation”75  
and advocates a “no harm” doctrine.76  As this theory and the Harmon Doctrine went against the 
very reliance and dependence of other riparian states networked with the transboundary water, 
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they are bound to lead to a zero-sum game and, thus, are not recognized as part of the 
contemporary international water law.77      
2.5.3  Limited Territorial Sovereignty (Integrity) Theory  
The substance of this theory is based on the assertion that all riparians (upstream and 
downstream) have an equal right in terms of utilizing the common water resource without 
inflicting any harm to the other.78  This theory is the reflection of the old legal Maxim “sic utere 
tuo ut alienum non caedus”, an embodiment of the idea that states must respect the right of other 
states sharing the same watercourse as they all have equal right.79  Because of this middle ground 
argument, the theory rejects the two extreme positions promoted by the Harmon Doctrine and the 
Theory of Absolute Territorial Integrity.  This theory recognizes the interdependence of riparians 
over the common water resource and the sovereign right of all the riparians to make use of the 
water resource lying within and passing through their territory.  It is a theory that harmonizes the 
rule of “No Significant harm” and “Equitable Utilization” and because of this reason it had 
survived the taste of time and become the basis of modern International water Law.80    
It is interesting to note, however, that a keen look at this theory would reveal that the principle of 
“No significant Harm” is not only an argument forwarded by the downstream riparian (as it is 
almost always the case to be) but also by an upstream riparian that may be prevented from 
utilizing the common water resource for developmental purposes and thereby precluded from 
benefiting the fruit generating there from.   Such an upstream state can make use of this principle 
as any denial to develop the common water resource will let it suffer a significant or appreciable 
harm.  Therefore, this theory, if not employed wisely and in good faith would backfire and create 
a “no winner” scenario.  This is a very important fact that downstream riparians should always 
bear in mind.  
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2.5.4  Theory of Prior Appropriation  
This theory rests on the premise that the earliest user of the common water resource maintains 
such a right of use throughout, even against the interest of the other upstream or downstream 
riparian.  The test to exercise such a right is a time reference- being a senior beneficiary of the 
water.  Therefore, this theory can be championed by whoever had started using the water first.  It 
is based on “first in time, first in right” principle.81  This theory is also known as a “Historic 
Right” or “Acquired Right”.  It takes the other riparian states hostage to the senior beneficiary as 
no water can be extracted without the consent of the senior riparian.  Any attempt to make use of 
the water by the new claimant would be vetoed.  Since in most cases it is the strong and most 
developed downstream country that would start exploiting the water resource first, the theory is 
promoted by such riparians.  Because of this reason, this theory is subjected to a strong argument 
that it is not based on fair and equitable foundation.82  
The Prior Appropriation Theory awards the strongest and relatively most developed riparian that 
had an opportunity to develop the water ahead of other riparians on the basis of a 
disproportionate right.  This theory in effect promotes monopolization and tends to perpetuate 
the developmental gap of the basin’s riparians. Above all, it fails to accommodate the changing 
dynamics on the ground and tends to result in a zero-sum game.  Owing to this limitation, the 
theory had long been challenged as incompatible with the generally accepted principles of 
“Equitable Utilization” and “No Significant Harm”. 
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2.6   The UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses 
The Convention on the Law of Non-navigational uses of International Watercourses was adopted 
by the United Nations General Assembly on May 21, 1997.  The Convention contains two 
cardinal principles on the management of an international watercourse.  These are the “Equitable 
and Reasonable Utilization” (Art.5) and the “No significant Harm” (Art.7) Principles.  Though 
codified in a Global Convention, the two principles found their origin from rules of Customary 
International Law.83 The codification of these principles into an International Convention is a 
manifestation of a strong effort to mitigate the impending transboundary water conflict through 
the instrumentality of legal principles.84  
Prior to the emergence of UN Convention on the Law of Non-navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses, the principles of “Equitable Utilization” and “No Significant Harm” were 
embodied into the Helsinki Rules of 1966 which had generally been a basis for the later work of 
the International Law Commission. 
2.6.1  The Principle of Equitable and Reasonable Utilization   
The basic essence of this principle is codified in Art.5 of the UN Watercourse Convention which 
states: 
1. Watercourse states shall in their respective territories utilize an international water 
course in an equitable and reasonable manner.  In Particular, an international 
watercourse shall be used and developed by watercourse states with a view to attaining 
optimal and sustainable utilization thereof and benefit there from, taking into account the 
interests of the watercourse states concerned, consistent with adequate protection of the 
watercourse. 
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2. Watercourse states shall participate in the use, development and protection of an 
international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner.  Such participation 
includes both the right to utilize the watercourse and the duty to cooperate in the 
protection and development thereof, as provided in the present convention. 
Paragraph 1 of this Art. sets forth how a riparian state should use the common water resources 
vis-a-vis other riparians.  Though the Convention does not define as to what constitutes 
“Equitable and Reasonable Use” the factors that ought to be taken into account in establishing 
the fact are outlined under Art.6. The enumeration made under Art. 6 is not exhaustive, leaving 
the parties concerned with the utmost freedom to consider some other factors as well.  Thus the 
issue of what type and manner of use shall make up “Equitable and Reasonable Use” is to be 
decided on a case by case basis. 
Paragraph 2 of the Convention deals with what is called ‘equitable and reasonable participation 
to safeguard the integrity of the ecosystem’.  Such Participation envisages mutual cooperation 
between and among riparians to take affirmative actions, individually or jointly, with regard to 
the watercourse.85   Thus the right to “Equitable and Reasonable Use” is linked with a duty to 
cooperate in the preservation and protection of the aquatic environment.  The element of 
sustainability is embodied therein. 
As it has already been noted, the principle of Equitable and Reasonable Utilization is not a 
Convention created norm.  Its root goes back to the judicial practice of Federal states like the 
USA, Germany and Switzerland and attained the status of Customary International Law.  Federal 
Supreme Court decisions in these countries reveal the application of this principle as the major 
basis of resolving the interstate water disputes.86   In this regard, the US Supreme Court applied 
the principle of Equitable Utilization in disposing the water dispute between Kansans and 
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Colorado in 1907 (Kansas V. Colorado).  In this particular case, Colorado (the upstream state) 
started using water from the Arkansas River.  Such an act of Colorado had been met with 
opposition from the down stream state Kansas.  Colorado tried to establish its right on the basis 
of the Harmon Doctrine, while Kansas protested on the basis of Prior Appropriation theory and 
No Harm Principle.  The Court rejected both arguments and reasoned its ruling on the basis of 
Equitable Utilization Principle by stating “so adjust the dispute upon the basis of equality of 
rights as to secure as far as possible to Colorado the benefits of irrigation without depriving 
Kansas of the like beneficial effects of a flowing stream”.87   The same reasoning had been 
applied by the Supreme Court on an interstate dispute over the Lara Mine River between 
Wyoming and Colorado states (Wyoming V. Colorado).88   
The core idea of the principle of Equitable and Reasonable Utilization is the question of entitling 
all watercourse states to have a fair share in the common water resource on the basis of the 
recognition that each basin state has an equal right to develop the commonly available 
resource.89  The principle basically protects and ensures the right of riparians who are yet to 
harness the water within their territory and seeks to avoid free ride and attain distributive justice 
on the basis of equity and fairness.  It aspires the establishment of future use rights by trying to 
put such new rights in par with previously established water use rights.90  Aaron Wolf described 
it as “the principle (that) gives the needs of the present the same weight as those of the past”.91  
Not surprisingly, therefore, the principle of Equitable and Reasonable utilization is keenly 
espoused by upstream riparians which for different political and economic reasons have been 
unable to develop the common water resource. 
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It is to be noted that the equation of the principle of Equitable and Reasonable Utilization is 
supplemented by Art.6 of the UN Convention which recommends the consideration of: 
A. Geographical, hydrographic, climatic, ecological and other factors of natural character; 
B. The social and economic needs of the water courses in each water course states 
concerned; 
C. The population dependent on the water course in each water course state; 
D. The effects of the use or uses of the water course in one watercourse state on the other 
water course state; 
E. Existing and potential uses of the watercourse; 
F. Conservation protection, development and economy of use of the water resources of the 
watercourse and the costs of measures taken to that effect; 
G. The availability of comparable value to a particular planned or existing use. 
The above outlined factors can fall into two broad categories as factors of natural character like 
hydrological, climatic, ecological etc... and factors of economic and social nature like economic 
needs, population dependent on the watercourse, effects of use on the water course state, existing 
and potential uses, conservation measures and availability of alternatives. 
Though, this principle have somehow won wide advocacy by the international community as a 
best mechanism to do away with potential water conflict, striking the balance with its 
corresponding principle i.e., the duty not to cause “Significant Harm”, is a daunting challenge. 
2.6.2  The Principle of No Significant Harm  
The 1997 UN Convention recognizes the principle of “No significant Harm” as the other side of 
the principle of “Equitable and Reasonable Utilization”.  Article 7 of the Convention is devoted 
to this principle. It States:- 
1. Watercourse states shall, in utilizing an international watercourse in their territories, 
take all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant harm to other water 
course states. 
[THE CONCEPT OF BENEFIT SHARING IN THE 
CONTEXT OF THE EASTERN NILE BASIN] 
 
 
46 CHAPTER TWO:  WATER AS A BONE OF CONTENTION |  
 
2. When significant harm nevertheless is caused by another water course state, the state 
whose use causes such a harm shall, in the absence of an agreement to such use, take all 
appropriate measures, having due regard for the provisions of article 5 and 6, in 
consultation with the affected state, to eliminate or mitigate such harm and when 
appropriate, to discuss the question of compensation. 
The “No Harm Principle” had the support of state practice as exhibited by different treaties 
between states and thus it is a norm of Customary International Law.   The principle is also an 
extension of the Private Law old maxim ‘sic utere tuo ut alienam non Laedas’ which prohibits 
the use of ones own property to inflict an injury to the property of another.92  
Joseph Dellapena argues that unless some sort of flexibility is injected to it, the tightly worded 
nature of the principle would sanction any meaningful developmental efforts of the upstream 
countries that ultimately would reduce the principle into a mere variant of the Absolute 
Territorial Integrity Doctrine.93  On the other hand, Hubert H.G Savenije and Peter Van der Zaag 
argued that “Equitable and Reasonable Utilization” and “No significant Harm” principles are not 
mutually exclusive, rather they are two sides of the same coin to be applied concurrently.94  The 
latter argument is much more convincing for the following reasons.  First, the principles of 
“Equitable and Reasonable Utilization” and “No Significant Harm” are not arguments 
exclusively reserved for upstream and downstream countries respectively.  Situations where “No 
significant Harm” rule can be relied upon by an upstream riparian and the rule of Equitable and 
Reasonable Utilization” by the downstream riparian are not totally excluded.  In this regard, 
Joseph Dellapenna questions: “Would not the barring of all development in the upstream state be 
harm to it, just as a reduction in the quantity or quality of flow reaching the downstream state is 
an injury to it?”95  Second, the question of conforming to the test of Equitable and Reasonable 
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Utilization cannot be sufficiently addressed without having due regard to the degree of harm that 
such a use may inflict on the interest of the other riparian at the other end of the tunnel.  
Therefore; there is an organic and logical interplay between the two principles.  A riparian which 
complains to have suffered a ‘significant harm’ should establish that the harm complained of was 
occasioned because the other riparian has utilized the water beyond what is considered to be 
equitable and reasonable.  This state of affair thus implies that the test of equitability of use 
without having regard to the degree of harm and the test of no significant harm without having 
recourse to the degree of equitability would not result in a fair disposition of the dispute.  Any 
understanding of these principles out of the context of their organic relationship would render the 
principles devoid of their intended meaning and significance and would bring about the egoistic 
principles of Absolute Territorial Sovereignty and Absolute Territorial Integrity back to the fore-
a zero-sum-game.  
However, the formidable challenge in this regard is the difficulty to concur on what constitutes 
“Equitable and Reasonable Utilization” and “No significant Harm”. The major problem is the 
vulnerability of both principles to different subjective interpretations in such a way that best 
serves the interest of each riparian state.  This is especially true in a river basin where there exists 
no treaty based legal regime governing the management of the common water resource.  To get 
out of this circular argument, Stephen C. McCaffrey advises: 
The practice of using treaties to regulate the relations of states sharing freshwater resources is 
generally advisable and to be recommended. Treaties stabilize those relations, giving them an 
element of certainty and predictability that is often not present otherwise. Riparian countries 
may also use treaties to establish joint management institutions with powers to further facilitate 
their cooperation with regard to sharing uses and benefits of international water courses.96   
The other continuing debate is associated with as to which principle prevails over the other. 
Dellapenna claims the unanimity of international water law experts on the primacy of equitable 
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utilization rule97 ,while Stephen C.McCaffrey (Fourth Special Rapporteur for the project) held 
the view that the International Law has intended for the prevalence of “No harm Rule” over the 
rule of “Equitable Utilization”.98   However; a closer look at Art. 7 which provides for “No 
significant Harm” suggests the primacy of Equitable Utilization especially when viewed against 
the reading of paragraph 2 of the Article which accommodates a sort of harm, if it is not of a 
significant nature.  Even in the case of Significant Harm, the remedy to the complaining riparian 
is limited to having recourse of consultation with the acting state with the view to eliminate or 
mitigate and where such effort fails to consider options of compensation. 
Therefore, even though paragraph 1 of Art.7 seems to categorically prohibit causing significant 
harm by imposing a duty of taking “all appropriate measures”, paragraph 2 renders a mitigating 
spirit to the duty.  In this regard, Stephen C. McCaffrey is of the view that when a conflict 
between the two principles is encountered the principle of Equitable Utilization would override 
the No Harm principle.99 Subjecting the examination of the harm to the provision of Art.5 and 6, 
he argues, is another indication that Equitable Utilization is given preeminence.100   
As already discussed, watercourse states may not find a lasting and stable solution through the 
straight forward application of the rules of the UN Convention.  The Convention is to mediate 
relations or conflict in the absence of a treaty based legal regime and because of the rocky road 
towards the settlement of water disputes via the application of the rules of the Convention per se 
basin states are not only recommended but also urged to sustainably settle their potential dispute 
through an all paying negotiated water treaty. 
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CHAPTER THREE: HISTORY OF COOPERATION IN THE NILE 
BASIN 
No attempt towards a multilateral engagement over the Nile Basin has been exercised prior to the 
1960s.  Many of such attempted cooperative frameworks had not only preoccupied themselves 
with technical matters such as, the collection and exchange of hydrological data, but also had not 
been able to attract the principal basin states like Ethiopia as their full fledged member.  Despite 
their functional limitations, the Nile Basin had witnessed the following multilateral cooperation 
endeavors. 
3.1 HYDROMET (Hydrometreological Survey of Equatorial Lakes) 
The basic motivation for the establishment of this project lies over the concern of the rising level 
of Lake Victoria in the early 1960s owing to an exceptional rainfall.  Such a worry brought 
together Egypt, Kenya, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda to establish this project with a basic aim of 
collecting and analyzing data for Lake Victoria, Kyoga and Albert Catchments and also to study 
the water balance of the White Nile.1  
The collection and analysis of the hydrological data was destined to facilitate water conservation 
planning and socio economic development.  Besides, it was meant to pave ways for a possible 
intergovernmental cooperation for the storage, regulation and use of the Nile Water resources.2  
The project had, however, failed to provide a cooperative framework for basin wide economic 
development by addressing differences and with the intent to better manage the Nile Waters 
among the riparian states.  This functional limitation had led some basin states to the perception 
that the whole effort was little more than evading the water allocation issue of the Basin.3  From 
the very outset Ethiopia and Kenya were very skeptical of the move.  Ethiopia kept herself away 
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from the club, though she joined it later after four years as a mere observer.  Such lack of 
wholeheartedness was even shared by the Equatorial riparian states for the mutual benefit of 
which the initiative was supposed to function.  The dominance of the initiative by downstream 
Egypt was among other factors that gave rise to the misgiving.  Finally, the project came to an 
end in 1992 without realizing its mission due to mistrust among its members, non-membership of 
Ethiopia and Kenya and lack of confidence building measures by the downstream state Egypt.4   
The project lasted from 1967-1992. 
3.1.1  UNDUGU/1983 – 1989/  
Unfortunately, this initiative had no much story to be told.  It was established in 1983 by Egypt, 
Sudan, Uganda, DRC, Rwanda, Brandi and Central African Republic (a non-basin state).  Here 
again, Ethiopia, Kenya and Tanzania were not full-fledged members but mere observers.  
Though the group was organized to realize cooperation in areas of infrastructure, environmental 
cooperation culture and trade, it accomplished neither of them than being a forum of discussion 
on drought.5  
3.1.2  TECCONILE (Technical Cooperation Commission for the 
Promotion and Development of Nile)  
This initiative is a relative success viewed against its predecessors.  It had crafted projects for the 
common good of the basin states though much of their implementation on the ground had never 
been put into effect.  Its members included Egypt, Sudan, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and DRC, 
while Ethiopia, Kenya, Burundi and Eritrea opted to remain as observers.  In the words of knife 
Abraham TECCONILE is a “resuscitated Hydromet”.6 The initiative came into being on January 
1993 upon the signing of its constitutive document with a long term and short term objectives to 
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reap future cooperative framework on water resource development of the basin.  The long term 
objective include the development of the Nile in an integrated and substantive manner and 
effecting equitable sharing of the Nile waters through the instrumentality of a basin wide 
cooperative framework.  Its short term objective was geared towards the development of 
infrastructure, capacity building, upgrading technical know-how for the management of the 
water resource and the formulation of National Master Plan.7  
The success stories of TECCONILE included inter alia, the formulation of 22 proposals, though 
they fell short of implementation owing to insufficient funding, and the initiation of the “Nile 
2002 Conferences”, an annually organized discussion forum of basin related issues since 1993.  
The D3 project is the most notable project as it sets the foundation for the establishment of a 
framework for a basin wide cooperation.8    It is to be noted that the project proposals of 
TECCONILE were transferred to its successor the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI). 
3.2   A Prelude to a Basin Wide Cooperation  
The ever- growing and competing economic interests over shared water resources are keeping 
the hydropolitical dispute in a constant motion.  The increasing gap between the demand and 
supply management of transboundary water due to demographic change and the deterioration of 
the aquatic ecosystem had become a tremendous concern for riparian states of the world. 
Many of the theories or principles supposed to adjudicate the right of access to transboundary 
water were not found to be of help to harmonize the contradictory claims as they are asserting an 
exclusive right of use by one riparian against the other.  Principles embodied in the 1997 UN 
Convention on International Watercourses are not as yet able to win the assent of all riparian 
states because of their vulnerability to different possible interpretations. 
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The growing consensus that a formula that pays all well would be better designed by a 
constructive engagement than by confrontation and the  insistence on the direct application of 
international water law principles brought riparian states to a conviction of negotiating a 
workable formula.  Of these, the protection and maintenance of the aquatic ecosystem which is 
the basic factor to keep the quantity and quality of the water intact through an integrated basin 
management is another impetus for a constructive engagement.  Because of these considerations 
the Nile Basin which is considered by many as a potential flash spot for conflict is witnessing a 
multilateral approach to harmonize conflicting interests between and among the basin states. 
As briefly discussed above, some earlier multilateral attempts of cooperation were not capable of 
addressing the focal and substantive points of difference on the use of the Nile waters, since they 
were structured to deal with technical and scientific issues like the collection and exchange of 
data.  In addition, such initiatives were not able to engage Ethiopia, the major Stakeholder of the 
basin as an active member. 
As of 1999 the Nile Basin countries have created a new transitional cooperative framework, 
called the NBI which is the watershed in breaking the code of silence and which also aspires to 
forge a peaceful and substantive solution on how the Nile Water resource should be equitably 
utilized by the basins sates. 
3.2.1  The Nile Basin Initiative  
The Nile Basin Initiative is basically a synergy that heralds the commencement of basin wide 
cooperative efforts and a shift from unilateralism to multilateralism in the development of the 
Nile Water resource. It is designed in such away that it will function in harmony with the 
protection of the aquatic environment which is an indispensable ingredient for the sustainability 
of the resource base.  The multilateral engagement on environmental issues can be viewed as 
manifestations of consideration for inter- generational interests of the people of the basin. 
In terms of functional structure, the Council of Ministers of Water Affairs of the Nile Basin 
States (NILE- COM) is the supreme decision making authority of the NBI, supported by the Nile 
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Technical Advisory Committee (NILE-TAC) while the Secretariat (NILE-SEC) based in 
Entebbe, Uganda is its executive arm. 
To advance the common interests of the Nile Basin states, the Council of Ministers of Water 
Affairs of the Nile Basin Countries agreed upon the creation of a transitional initiative that would 
act as a linking path to the critically needed permanent legal and institutional framework.  The 
NBI, which had officially been launched in Feb.1999, has five basic objectives as indicated in 
the Policy Guidelines for the Nile Basin Strategic Action Program of Feb.1999.  These are: 
1. To develop the water resources of the Nile Basin in a sustainable and equitable way to 
ensure prosperity, security and peace for all its people; 
2. To ensure efficient water management and the optimal use of the resources; 
3. To ensure cooperation and joint action between the riparian countries seeking win-win 
gains; 
4. To target poverty eradication and promote economic integration; 
5. To ensure that the program results in a move from planning to action.9  
In addition the Initiative is dictated by a basin wide shared vision which is destined: 
“to achieve sustainable socio-economic development through the equitable utilization of, and 
benefit from, the common Nile Basin Water resources”   
3.2.1.1  The Shared Vision Program [SVP]  
 
In order to realize the “Shared Vision “program across the basin SVP  was crafted through the 
participation of all basin states, save Eritrea.  These Shared Vision Programs are to be put in 
effect through the instrumentality of the “Subsidiary Action Program (SAP) at the Sub-basin and 
local level. 
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The Shared Vision Program of the Basin has identified seven projects which are endorsed by 
NILE-COM for implementation. These are: 
 
1. Applied Training Project- to strengthen capacity in areas of water resource planning and 
management.  
2. Nile Trans boundary Environmental Action Project- to provide a strategic framework for 
environmentally sustainable development of the Nile River Basin.  
3. Nile Basin Regional power Trade Project- to establish the institutional means to 
coordinate the development of regional power markets among the Nile Basin Countries. 
4. Efficient water use for Agriculture Project- to provide a sound conceptual and practical 
basis to increase the availability and efficient use of water for agricultural production. 
5. Water Resources planning and Management Project – to enhance the analytical capacity 
for basin wide perspective to support the development, management and protection of 
Nile Basin waters. 
6. Confidence Building and Stakeholders Involvement Project- to develop confidence in 
regional cooperation under the NBI, both at basin and local levels, and ensure full 
stakeholder involvement in the NBI and its projects. 
7. Socio-economic Development and Benefit Sharing Project- to strengthen Nile River basin 
wide socioeconomic cooperation and integration.10  
3.2.1.2  The Subsidiary Action Program [SAP] 
 
The first wing of the SAP is the Eastern Nile Subsidiary Action Program (ENSAP) which 
comprises Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan, while the other wing is the Nile Equatorial Lakes 
Subsidiary Action Program (NELSAP) which comprises all the Nile Basin States except Ethiopia 
and Eritrea. 
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ENSAP and NELSAP are supposed to engage in the following twelve main economic and 
environmental activities: 
 
1. River regulation 
2. Water harvesting and conservation 
3. Hydropower generation 
4. Irrigated food production 
5. Watershed management and soil erosion control 
6. Reduction of  evaporation losses from swamps 
7. Fisheries development 
8. Transport and navigation development 
9. Eco-tourism development  
10. Weed control 
11. Waste water treatment, pollution control and water quality management and; 
12. Water use efficiency improvement.11  
In the Eastern Nile Basin, a Joint Technical Team (ENSAPT) is established to give technical 
support to ENSAP in terms of defining and prioritizing water related projects which are of 
common interest to members of the sub-basin.12  The ENSAP’s cooperative aspiration is the 
development of the Eastern Nile water resource in a sustainable and equitable manner so that 
prosperity, security and peace can be attained by the entire people of the sub-basin as a dividend 
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of cooperation.13 These specific ideals of the sub-basin are the sub-set of the basin wide Shared 
Vision Program. 
With the view to put developmental and environmental plans into action ENSAP has designed 
the following sub-projects for implementation.14  
 
1. Integrated water Resources planning and Management. 
• Eastern Nile Planning Model 
• Baro-Akobo Multipurpose Water Resources Project. 
2. Flood and Drought Management, 
• Flood preparedness and Early Warning 
3. Hydropower Development and Regional Power Trade, 
• Ethiopia-Sudan Transmission Interconnection 
• Eastern Nile Power Trade Investment Program 
4. Irrigation and Drainage Development, 
• Irrigation and Drainage Development 
5. Watershed Management  
• Watershed Management 
The successful accomplishment of these projects is crucial to demonstrate that win-wins can be 
achieved at the sub-basin level.  
3.2.2 The Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework 
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As it is noted, the NBI is a Transitional Cooperative Initiative.  The basin countries have agreed 
to negotiate and come up with a permanent legal and institutional cooperative frame work, which 
is capable of diffusing the age old disputes on the management and utilization of the Nile 
Waters.  This permanent cooperative framework is expected to put in the equation the widely 
recognized general principles of International Water Law, especially the harmonized version of 
‘Equitable Utilization’ and ‘No Significant Harm’, to mould a permanent institutional structure 
with the objective of administering the would be delivered multilateral water treaty. 
With this basic objective in mind, the NILE-COM has endorsed the D3 Project in Feb.1995 
which was later integrated into the NBI to deal with negotiating the Cooperative Framework 
Agreement. The project had two long term objectives to attain: 
1. To determine equitable entitlements for each riparian country for the use of Nile 
Waters. 
2. Enhance and promote the utilization of Nile Waters for maximum socio-economic 
benefits of the inhabitants of the basin.15  
In order to have a blue print for consideration, a Panel of Experts (POE), with three 
representatives from each country, had been established.  Accordingly the POE has produced the 
following two inputs for the NILE-COM. 
1. Recommendations for an appropriate multidisciplinary framework for legal and 
institutional arrangements for water resources development on the Nile basin. 
2. Recommendations for processes, methodology and activities that could lead to the 
determination of equitable and legitimate rights of equitable and legitimate rights 
of water use in each riparian countries.16  
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 Id, at 62   
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 Id.   
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Unfortunately, the text of the cooperative framework drafted by the POE was found to be 
inadequate to address substantive differences and resulted in the establishment of a Negotiating 
Committee to reach an agreement on the basic bone of contention.17 The outstanding differences, 
basically, rested on whether the new cooperative framework should supersede the prevailing 
agreement or should it honor and leave it intact.18  
As moving ahead with the negotiation proved difficult, a concept called “Water Security” was 
introduced in a quest to harmonize the outstanding differences.  Conceptually an attempt has 
been made to define “Water Security” at the extraordinary meeting of the Nile-COM at Addis 
Ababa in March, 2006.  Accordingly, the concept was defined to be “the right to reliable and 
sustained access to and use of [The Nile River System] water for health, livelihoods and 
production” The inclusion of the phrase ‘the Nile River System’ was proposed by Ethiopia.19  It 
is not clear whether such a definition has enjoyed the approval of all the basin states.  To the 
dissatisfaction of many the pace of the negotiation suffered a setback again, which obliged the 
negotiators to conclude the negotiation process as it was and pass it over to the Head of States of 
the Nile Basin states for further consideration.  Such a decision was reached by the Nile-COM at 
a meeting in Entebbe, Uganda, in June 2007. 
The contentious Art.14 on Water Security as its final version upon the conclusion of the 
negotiation reads as follow: 
Art.14 
Water Security 
Having due regard for the provision of Art.4 and 5, Nile Basin States recognize the vital 
importance of water security to each of them.  The states also recognize that cooperative 
                                                          
17
 Id, at 63  
18
 Yacab Arsano & Imeru Tamirat, Ethiopia and the Eastern Nile Basin,67 Aquatic Science15,20(2005)  
19 The information and facts discussed in relation to the negotiation of the Cooperative Framework 
Agreement are based on a personal communication with an informant who is near to the negotiation 
process and who requested anonymity.  
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management and development of the water of the Nile River system will facilitate achievement of 
water security and benefits.  Nile Basin States therefore agree, in a spirit of cooperation;  
a. to work together, to ensure that all states achieve and sustain water security.  
b. not to significantly affect the water security of any other Nile Basin State.20 
All the basin states agreed to such a formulation except Egypt and Sudan.  Egypt, especially 
insisted to re-phrase sub-article (b) as follows:  
“not to adversely affect the Water Security and Current uses and rights of any other basin 
state” 21[Stress Added] 
A painstaking comparative analysis of the contentious sub-article as agreed upon by other Nile 
riparians (except Egypt and Sudan) and the re-phrased version of the same by Egypt is critically 
important.  As already noted, before the concept of water security was introduced into the 
negotiated document the real difference was rested on whether or not prior water agreements 
should continue to be valid.  While Ethiopia and other upper riparian states argued for the 
repudiation of such agreements, Egypt and Sudan, on the other hard press hard to maintain the 
status quo. Hence, the issue for debate, by then, was crystal clear- a move for and against the 
status quo. 
Now, a close examination of the contentious sub-article (b) on water security would reveal the 
essence of the underlying difference.  The wording of sub-article (b) as approved by the 
upstream states of the basin establishes that water security shall be achieved by all the basin 
states, but such a right is to be relied upon if and only if a use of the water by a basin state inflicts 
significant water security problem to another basin state. This formulation appear to be in 
tandem with the interplay between the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization and no 
significant harm principle as norms of conventional and customary international law.  The 
formulation accepts the right of a basin state to use the waters of the Nile to such an extent that it 
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 The New Times, Rwanda’s First Daily; issue 13640, (Kigali) 1 September, 2008.  
21
 Id.  
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doesn’t produce “significant” effect on the water security of the other basin states.  This is 
inconformity with the first paragraph of Art.14 that provides for the principle of equitable and 
reasonable utilization and factors to be considered in establishing equitability and Art.5 which is 
devoted to the principle of no-significant harm.  Hence, the effect of the interplay between Art. 4 
and 5 has found expression on sub article (b) of Art.14. 
The basic and inherent problem within the formulation is, however, its potential of falling back 
to the issue of the status of previous water agreements. For instance, it poses a basic question as 
to from when does the point of departure for water security start. If the current use of water is 
taken to be the point of reference in establishing whether a given use has caused significant water 
security problem or not, then it means in effect that water use rights established by prior 
agreements should remain intact.  Therefore, if a point of departure for weighing water security 
issues is not clearly established any new use that would inevitably change the established pattern 
of the Nile water utilization may be taken as “significant” in bringing about a water security 
problem to historical uses.  This possible scenario makes clarity on this point enormously 
important. Even the agreed version of sub-article (b) by other riparian states lacks capacity in 
spotting the point of departure.  
The redesign of the wording of sub-article (b) by Egypt is quite clear in its intention.  It made it 
abundantly clear that the issue of water security be related to current uses and rights.  The point 
of departure is the existing use and the established rights in line with the 1959 Water Agreement.  
Therefore, Egypt’s point of view is nothing but the other way of putting her age old argument 
that any cooperative agreement on the use of the Nile waters should not impact the status quo. 
Because of such polarized positions between upstream and downstream states, the concept of 
water security as it stands now added no value in breaking the stalemate.  
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As Ana Elisa Casiao stated the embodiment of the concept of water security into the draft 
document as “Constructive ambiguity” turned out to be destructive as the very concept itself 
happened to be “the corner stone...of the hydropolitical impasse in the basin”22  
It is argued that ambiguities may have a potential value to “cement conflicting positions over 
natural resources when sovereignty costs are high and there is an asymmetrical power 
balance”23 and thereby move the negotiation process forward.  However, when the very area of 
ambiguity touches upon the basic essence of the negotiation clarity rather than ambiguity should 
be opted. This is true in the Nile context where the ambiguity was tried to be applied to the real 
problematique and as a result of which the whole effort proved to be a point of polarization 
than making a break through over the negotiation that lasted more than a decade.  
If the current stalemate is to continue basically because of the insistence of Egypt to maintain the 
status quo, the following three questions would naturally arise.  First what rational does Egypt 
has to come to the negotiation table without a compromising mentality? Second in the absence of 
such a mentality is engagement in a negotiation process a tactic to perpetuate the status quo? 
Third, would such a stance serve the long term interest of Egypt? These are some of the basic 
questions that need careful examination.  
There are evidences to the effect that Egypt’s decision to embark upon negotiation over the 
utilization of the Nile waters is not a self motivated but an imposed move.   
Ashok Swain stated the matter clearly as follows:  
As a result of World Bank pressure Egypt has agreed to a shift in its foreign policy over the 
Nile water issue.  Egypt’s economy is in a precarious state; the problem become more acute 
after the World Bank sharply reduced its lending to the country from $500 million in 1990 to 
approximately $50 million in 2000.  This changing economic landscape has practically forced 
                                                          
22 Ana Elisa Cascao, Constructive Ambiguity as a Solution for the Nile Legal Dead Lock, (Paper 
Presented on Nile Basin Development Forum Conference (Dec. 2008) Khartoum, Sudan, at 2,6  
23 Itay flaschhender, Ambiguity in Transboundary Environmental Dispute Resolution: The Israeli 
Jordanian Water Agreement, 45 Journal of Peace Research 91, 106(2008)  
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Egypt into expressing its willingness to cooperate and relinquish its longstanding policy of 
defending disproportionate consumption of Nile water based on the principle of ‘acquired 
rights24. [Stress Added]  
As clearly depicted from the above citation the pressured move of Egypt to engage in the 
negotiation process and the unwillingness to compromise on the status quo somehow expresses 
her dilemma.  Hence, if such a dilemma persists and if equitable and reasonable utilization of the 
Nile waters is not realized the many accusations which allege Egypt’s engagement in the 
negotiation process as a tactical application to perpetuate the status quo would make sense.  
Whatever tactic may be applied the status quo can not be maintained indefinitely.  Basin states 
advocating for equitable and reasonable utilization would resort to aggressive unilateralism 
which may not take into account the interest of other basin states.  Such a move would not only 
pose a potential conflict but is also detrimental to the ecosystem of the basin as a whole.  These 
developments are not certainly to the interest of Egypt in the long run. 
The diagram below by Anna Elisa Casiao which is based on the information collected through 
interviews with national negotiators, NBI officers, external partners and analysts depict a gloomy 
picture which somehow highlights the real challenge of converting divergences into 
convergences over the basic issues of negotiation.  
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 Ashok Swain, The Nile River Basin Initiative: Too Many Cooks, Too Little Broth, XXII SAIS Review 
293, 302-303(2002)  
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Figure 0-1 Upstream and Downstream Expectation towards the Cooperative Framework Agreement 
Source:  Anna Elisa   Cascao (2008) 
The above picture shows that downstream states are not expecting a new agreement that allows 
the renegotiation of volumetric allocation of water while they are looking for an agreement that 
ensures prior uses, acquired rights, prior notification, new water and no-harm principle.  In short 
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On the other extreme, the upstream riparians are looking for the delivery of a new agreement that 
allows the renegotiation of volumetric allocation of water, new uses of water, and an agreement 
that recognizes the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization, and that repudiates acquired 
rights.  In general they are against the maintenance of acquired rights.  
Even if the above picture may not necessarily be true and there may still be a possibility to 
change the picture positively through further negotiation, as things stand now many of them 
appear to be reasonable observations.  
Be that as it may, Cooperative Framework Agreement is the basis for further negotiated 
agreements on volumetric allocation and/or benefit sharing arrangements.  Along with benefit 
sharing mechanisms, volumetric water allocation need to be agreed upon, as the two scenarios 
are not mutually exclusive but are ‘inverse faces of the same coin’. 25  The simultaneous 
application of the two approaches is of pivotal importance especially in a basin where inequitable 
volumetric fixation is prevalent.26 In the Eastern Nile context such a joint application is also 
quite relevant firstly because commercializing water access during seasons of peak flow between 
riparians is one aspect of benefit sharing (through purchase agreements) and secondly ensuring 
equitable and reasonable utilization concurrently  implies volumetric fixation.  In this regard it is 
held; 
“any...system of sharing benefits must nevertheless be related in some fashion to volumetric 
allocations, as otherwise no coherent plat form exists for deciding on how the benefits may be 
shared (or on compensation)”27 
In a similar tone it is further emphasized: 
                                                          
25Andres Jagerskog & David Phillips, UNDP, Managing Transboundary Water for Human Development 
10(2006)  
26Halla Qadumi, ODI, Practical Approaches to Transboundary Water Benefit Sharing 6 (2008)  
27David Phillips etal, Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs,  Transboundary Water Cooperation as a Tool 
for Conflict Prevention and Broader Benefit sharing 154(2006) 
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there is a question as to whether the issue of water right can be separated from that of benefit 
sharing .For example where benefit sharing implies transfer of existing fixed water supplies, 
some assignment of water right is required in order to determine the compensation due28. 
Under such a context, one practical scenario can be looked into. As already noted, Sudan has the 
greatest potential for irrigated agriculture. Such a big potential can be fully exploited if it is 
supported by a water flow from Ethiopia. Ethiopia would be willing to release her water resource 
to the agricultural plot downstream if she is convinced of a greater economic return as opposed 
to using the water within her territory unilaterally. Under such practical circumstances water is 
used as a contribution to the common economic project for sharing benefits. To do this Ethiopia 
need first to establish her legitimate and equitable share of the Nile waters. 
Hence, any cooperative deal which would not envisage volumetric allocation along with a 
benefit sharing scheme may not be able to exploit the benefit sharing arrangement to its optimal 
limit. Disregard for volumetric fixation would, therefore deny water not only as an economic 
variable for contribution in mutual developmental projects but would also disable 
commercialization of water as an important tool of addressing water scarcity within the basin. 
In relation to the issue of water allocation in the Nile there are proposals forwarded by scholars.  
Whittington and McClelland (1992) and many others advocated a water control structure in 
Ethiopia as a replacement for the Aswan High Dam (AHD) and Lake Nasser which would 
reduce evaporation and seepage with the ultimate effect of making water available for 
reconfiguring the Nile water for Ethiopians consumption.29   This water saving strategy though 
capital and time intensive may ease the downstream states worry over the reallocation of the Nile 
water.  
Finally, it should, however, be noted that, the above discussion on the Draft Cooperative 
Framework is without prejudice to the commendable consensual resolutions on the two cardinal 
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principles of international watercourse law -the principle of Equitable and Reasonable Utilization 
(Art.4(1) DCFA) and the principle of No Significant Harm (Article 5/1, DCFA).  
The wordings of the two principles are directly transported from Art. 5 and 7 of the 1997 UN 
Convention.  Such direct incorporation makes the wealth of international literature on these 
issues to belong to the Nile Basin legal regime.   
The DCFA has come also with two additional variables relevant in establishing equitable and 
reasonable utilization which are not within the list of Art. 6 of the 1997 UN Convention.  
However, it should be stated that such variables, i.e. the contribution of each basin state to the 
waters of the Nile River System (Art. 4/2/h, DCFA) and the extent and proportion of the 
drainage area in the territory of each basin state (Art 4/2/i, DCFA) are not pure innovations but 
adaptations from the provision of Art. 5(2)(a) and art 5(2)(f) of the Helsinki (1966) Rules.    
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CHAPTER FOUR: BENEFIT SHARING – A FRAMWORK FOR 
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS  
In the international water management sharing benefits is claiming preference over the 
traditional physical water allocation. The conceptual rational for such a benefit sharing is the 
understanding that water as a resource should not be considered a "stock" but as a "flow" which 
can generate more benefits over a long period of time . Such an approach enables the optimum 
utilization of the full economic potential of an international river basin. 
Conceptually benefit sharing is defined to be "any action designed to change the allocation of 
costs and benefits associated with cooperation"1  . The definition makes clear that costs and 
benefits are two versions of the same coin. The cost benefit analysis is an important element 
which would help decide whether a cooperative framework with benefit sharing in mind would 
be realized or not. It is only when riparian states are of the conviction that the deal is "feasible, 
cost effective and fair" that they would contemplate to be part of a cooperative arrangement2 . 
Cooperative engagement is sometimes called a risky business, because it entails relinquishing 
not only the hitherto available gains from unilateral actions but may also include financial, 
institutional and political/ relational costs3. 
Transboundary water cooperation is fundamentally political activity as it involves geopolitical, 
strategic and foreign policy interest4 . However, the interactive role of economics should not be 
neglected. 
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 Claudia W. Sadoff & David Grey, Cooperation on International Rivers: A Continuum for Securing and 
Sharing Benefit, 30 International water Resources Association, December 2005, at 3. 
2
 Id.  at 6 
3 Id. 
4
 Alex Klapnake, Economic and Political Benefits of Transboundary Water Cooperation, paper presented 
at the Technical University of Berlin( March 10-11, 2005), Koblenz, Germany 
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 The big challenge in the realization of benefit sharing as the higher level of cooperation is the 
difficulty to frame the formula through which cost and benefits can be apportioned. This is so, 
because of the diversified and sometimes contradictory expectations of the riparian states out of 
the cooperative endeavor. For benefit sharing to be sustainable there need to be satisfaction 
among the riparian states that the "pie" is fairly distributed5 . As states are welfare maximizing 
entities, they would commit themselves to forge cooperation if they perceive that the benefit to 
be extracted will outweigh the imagined benefit deriving from unilateral actions6 . Therefore, the 
virtue of benefit sharing lies as long as it can prove itself of offering a greater bundle of net 
economic and social benefits to the stakeholders than they can imagine under purely state- 
centric unilateral developments. It is only when this dilemma is solved clearly that states would 
opt for cooperative arrangement relinquishing unilateral advantages. In this connection Erike 
Motert held: 
What drives transboundary water management are not 'objective' benefits but the subjective 
perceptions and motivation of the major stakeholders. If in their eyes cooperation is a better 
alternative than non-cooperation, transboundary water management will progress. If not it will 
stall7. 
Cooperation for benefit sharing has also other triggers than the perceived economic and social 
benefits. Floods, pollution hazards, acute water scarcities and other environmental problems, 
which by their nature are beyond unilateral management, would pave the way for cooperation 
and benefit sharing arrangements8 . Riparians in arid and semi-arid regions with acute water 
scarcity, as is the case in the Jordan River basin, are more ready for cooperation than riparians 
                                                          
5
 Sadoff and Grey Supra note 1 at 4. 
6
 Id. at 6  
7
 Erik Motert, German Development Institute, How can International Donors Promote Transboundary 
Water Management? 5 (2005) 
8
 Pieter Van der Zaag & Hubert H.G. Savenije, Towards Improved Management of Shared River Basins: 
Lessons from the Maseru Conference, 2 water Policy 47, 62 (2000) 
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with hypothetical water scarcity 9 . In such kind of collective problems, the incentive for 
cooperation is much more compelling10. 
Natural and man-made crises had also necessitated the desire for cooperation, the Sandoz 
incident of 1986 where a large amount of agro-chemicals flowed into the Rhine in Switzerland 
inflicting an environmental disaster in the downstream riparians formed the basis for the Rhine 
Action Program of 1987 through which the cleaning of the Rhine was facilitated jointly. 
Similarly, the sever drought that hit southern Africa in 1987 was a major factor that triggered the 
framing and signing of a "Protocol on Shared Watercourse Systems" which is a general 
framework for water related works between riparians11. 
Conflicts over the question of access to a common water resource are not necessarily and always 
with negative implications. A conflict properly handled may be a catalyst for a win-win 
cooperation through innovation, new ways of thinking and additional management options. In 
this regards, the NBI (Nile Basin Initiative) can be an illustration12 . 
In terms of typology, Sadoff and Grey identified four types of benefits that cooperation may 
bring about. These are benefits to the river (type 1), benefits from the river (type 2), benefits 
because of the river (type 3) and benefits beyond the river (type 4)13 . Building up on the works 
                                                          
9
 Muserref Yetim, Governing International Common Pool Resources: The International Water Courses of 
the Middle East, 4 Watery Policy 305, 319 (2002) 
10
 Alex Klapnake & Waltina Scheumann, Understanding Transboundary Water Cooperation: Evidence 
from Africa 3-4(2006) 
11
 Hubert H.G Savenije & Pieter Van der Zaag, Conceptual Framework for the Management of shared 
River Basins; with special Reference to the SADC and EU 2 water policy 9, 21-22 (2002) 
12
 William J. Cosgrov, UNESCO, Water Security and Peace: A Synthesis of Studies Prepared under 
PCCP- Water for Peace Process 64-65 (2003). 
13
 Claudia .Sadoff & David Grey, Beyond the river: The Benefits Of Cooperation on International Rivers, 
4 water policy 389, 401-402 (2002); Sadoff & Grey, Supra note 1, at 2 
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of Sadoff and Grey, a theoretical tool known as the Inter-SEDE model has also been 
developed.14  
 The Model employs three indicators as drivers of cooperation. These are Security, Economic 
development and Environment. The Model helps to identify which driver is more relevant and 
significant to drive cooperation. It enables stakeholders to pinpoint the best dynamic issue of 
grave concern that necessitated cooperation. Employing the model as a tool of analysis it has 
been revealed that issues of water related security have been the predominant concern of 
riparians in the Jordan River Basin. The same analysis has also established that issues of 
biodiversity and biological productivity driven by flood pulse have been the preoccupation of 
riparians in the Mekong river basin15 . The four types of benefits discussed by Sadoff and Grey 
have been categorized to be benefits of environment (type 1), direct economic cooperation   (type 
2), political (type 3) and indirect economic cooperation (type 4)16 . These variants of cooperation 
are interlinked in such a way that any success or failure in one of the variants may have a 
negative or positive implication on the other 17 . For instance, a sound and professional 
management of the basin's ecosystem would undoubtedly enhance the potential benefit to be 
derived from the river - therefore, a logical and clear interdependence between type 1 and type 2 
benefits. Any setback in the realization of trustworthy and sustainable political relations under 
type 3 would inevitably hamper potential benefits under type 1, type 2, and type 4 benefits.18   
Of all these benefits, benefit to the river (type 1) is of utmost importance, as all other benefits 
pivot upon it. Extracting economic and social benefits is unthinkable in a fragile and wretched 
ecosystem. If securing social, economic and political gains are targeted, keeping the ecological 
integrity becomes a mandatory task for riparians. This paramount task of maintaining the 
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 Sadoff and Grey, Supra note 13, at 403. 
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 Id, at 402 
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productivity of the ecosystem is to be carried out through the instrumentality of the tool called 
Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM). This tool is defined by the Global Water 
Partnership to be: 
A process which promotes the coordinated development of water, land and related resources to 
maximize the resultant economic and social welfare in an equitable manner without 
compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystem 19 
When issues of benefit sharing are contemplated all stakeholders of an international watercourse 
may not be arithmetically on equal position to benefit equally for various reasons. Under such 
circumstances compensatory schemes have to be designed. The riparian(s) which in relative 
terms benefit more should compensate the other riparian(s) which stand to benefit less (total loss 
is unimaginable in a cooperative framework) through the instrumentality of different tools like 
financial grant to the extent of the loss suffered, in kind compensation for lost benefits, 
preferential access and treatment in other services of mutual interest, provision of non-water 
related goods and services20. However, it should be noted that relevant compensatory schemes 
are situation specific and are subjected to negotiation between or among riparian states. 
Before a cooperative framework for benefit sharing is fully agreed upon in any international river 
the types of specific benefits (i.e., agriculture, hydropower, flood control, and other like cultural, 
environmental, fishery, navigation, and eco-tourism), the priority and the distributive 
mechanisms of the benefits, the cost sharing mechanism have to be fully assessed to the 
satisfaction of all riparians.21  
In general terms benefit sharing is a new paradigm that discourages polarized claims for water 
and is capable of defusing the conflict potential that stems from unilateralism. The fundamental 
basis for its operation is the convergence of interests of the riparian states (shared vision) as it 
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 Cosgrov, Supra note 12 at 81 
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 Sadoff and Grey, Supra note 13, at 397 
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 Biniam Eyob, Equitable Distribution of Benefits in Transboundary Waters: The Nile and Columbia 
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may be expressed by the political commitment for mutual engagement in the development of the 
common water resources. 
4.1  Basic Justifications for Benefit Sharing 
There are many justifications for benefit sharing as will be discussed below. These justifications 
can be classified into three broad categories as economic, environmental and peace and security. 
4.1.1 Economic or Development Rational 
It has been discussed that one of the benefits that can be spawned from a cooperative framework 
for benefit sharing is economical- benefit from the river. This is the leading rational that 
motivates cooperation. Benefits of economical nature include hydropower, irrigated agriculture, 
navigation, eco- tourism, flood control, fishery, livestock, forestry etc.... The type of optimum 
economic benefits to be reaped depends upon the peculiar nature of each basin. 
There are some experiences where riparians were able to extract economic benefits out of 
cooperation both in bilateral and multilateral settings. In the case of bilateral arrangements the 
Lesotho Highland Water Project (LHWP) between Lesotho and South Africa and the Columbia 
River basin between the US and Canada are illustrative ones. 
In the case of “LHWP” South Africa and Lesotho signed a deal to mutually benefit from a joint 
river development. Under the arrangement the two parties agreed to construct water control 
structures (dams) on the territory of Lesotho in the upper reaches of the Orange-Senque River for 
the purpose of water supply and hydropower generation.22  The arrangement provides for least 
cost water transfer to the industrial province of South Africa (Gauteng Province) against the 
payment of royalty that amounts up to 5% of the Lesotho GDP.23  The hydropower benefit of the 
project goes to Lesotho as per the 1986 Treaty between the two countries.24  
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 Sadoff and Grey, Supra note 13, at 396. 
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 UNEP, Dams and Development Project: Compendium on Relevant Practice (2nd stage) 87 (2007). 
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Hence, this bilateral deal produced a tangible economic benefit to the parties, in terms of 
supplying water for industrial and municipal consumption and generating hydropower as well. 
The Columbia River Treaty and Protocol (1964) provides for the establishment of an upstream 
storage structure in Canada and the sharing of the power and flood control benefits that accrues 
to the US because of the upstream storage25. According to the treaty Canada agreed to construct 
dams which would have the effect of enhancing the development of hydroelectric power and 
protecting flood in the down stream USA. The US reciprocally agreed to pay Canada for the 
power and flood control benefits26. The extent of Canada's benefits was agreed to be half of the 
power benefit that have resulted from the storage facility and a fixed sum for the food 
protection27. Therefore the Columbia River treaty also exhibits the sharing of economic benefits 
out of the mutual development of the river. 
In a multilateral context, the Senegal and the Mekong River Basins are worth considering 
experiences. The Senegal River Basin countries in response to the drought they suffered in the 
1970s opted for a multilateral approach to develop the Senegal River Basin and share benefits 
equitably. To this effect Senegal (down steam) Mali and Mauritania (both up stream) established 
an institution, OMVS (The Senegal River Basin Development Authority) in 1972 that would 
coordinate and facilitate their common vision. Guinea (upstream) is not active part of the 
cooperative framework though it holds an observer status. The joint developmental program 
manifested itself in the construction of Diama Dam in Senegal and Mauritania Dam in Mali both 
owned and operated jointly. The economic output expected was the supply of year round water 
for irrigation and municipal uses, hydropower production and year long navigation, for member 
riparians. From this common project, Mali was to benefit navigation and hydropower while 
Mauritania was to benefit from irrigation and hydropower and Senegal stood to benefit from 
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navigation, irrigation and hydropower 28 .The Senegal basin development Scenario therefore, 
represents the significance of cooperation in exploiting the economic potential of the common 
water resources to the benefit of all the stake holders- a win- win resolution.  
The other multilateral approach where the concept of benefit sharing had been put into practice is 
the Mekong River Basin. This basin is characterized by cooperation among members of the 
Lower Mekong sub-basin, i.e., Cambodia, Vietnam, Thailand and Laos. Due to the absence of 
China and Myanmar from the cooperative framework, cooperation in this basin is not an all-
inclusive. 
Four of the basin countries have established the Mekong River Commission (MRC) by the 1995 
Agreement on cooperation for the sustainable development of the Mekong River Basin 29 
The 1995 framework agreement has tried to accommodate different interests of the basin 
countries. For instance, Thailand is interested to have cheap hydropower and enough water for 
her agricultural sector, Laos wishes to enhance her hydropower generating potential, Cambodia 
is much more interested in having a well secured seasonal flow for her fishing industry while 
Vietnam looks for the construction of hydropower facilities in the central highlands and for the 
development of efficient agriculture and aquaculture in the Delta30. 
The co-riparians according to Art. 1 of the 1995 Agreement committed themselves to jointly 
develop "irrigation..., hydropower, navigation, flood control, fisheries, timber floating, recreation 
and tourism in a manner to optimize the multiple use and mutual benefits of all riparians and to 
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minimize the harmful effects that might result from natural occurrences and man made 
activities''31.  
As it is self evident from the above citation the scope of benefits that the agreement anticipates to 
achieve is wide in scope. To this end the vision for the Mekong River Basin is defined to be "An 
economically prosperous, socially just and environmentally sound Mekong River Basin" 32 .  
Besides, institutional vision and mission has also been agreed upon. Accordingly the vision for 
the MRC was crafted to be "A world class, financially secure, international river basin 
organization serving the Mekong countries to achieve the basins vision" 33, while the mission is " 
To promote and coordinate sustainable management and development of water and related 
resources for the countries mutual benefit and the people's well being by implementing strategic 
programs and providing scientific information and policy advise" 34 
Of all the areas of cooperation agriculture stands to benefit the basin states more in providing 
food security. Statistics shows that all the signatory states (except Thailand) find themselves 
under the poverty line35. In Laos and Cambodia agricultural represent 30 and 50% of their total 
GDP respectively36. All this shows how significant cooperation over the agricultural sector is. 
The hydropower potential of the basin is 55,000MW of which only 8% is exploited37. Even 
though the level of exploitation as compared to the total potential is minimal, the untapped 
potential still shows the tremendous economic potential that could be generated. 
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The Mekong River Basin agreement, therefore, demonstrates the strong anticipated economic 
benefits which are capable of driving riparian states to forge cooperation with the view of 
sharing benefits. But, it should be noted with caution that there is a big space between 
conceptualization and realization. 
4.1.2 Environmental Considerations 
It has been pointed out in the discussion supra that the cooperation for maintaining the 
ecological integrity should be given prior concern if the natural resources of any international 
watercourse is to be sustainably exploited for the benefit of inter and intra generations. This 
concern for the aquatic system is taken to be one of the benefits that basin cooperation aspires to 
achieve. In the words of Sadoff and Grey, it is labeled to be benefit to the river. 
The regard for maintaining the integrity of the aquatic environment was not of a serious agenda 
in a cooperative framework up until the 1990s where sustainable economic development is 
linked to the well managed ecosystem, which takes coordinated development and management 
of water, land and related resources as its component. (See the definition of IWRM infra)  
The issue of caring for the aquatic environment was first discussed in the 1977 United Nations 
Conference on Water held in Mar del Plata, Argentina. Motivated by the desire to avoid global 
water crises before the turn of the 20thc, the Conference approved what is called the Mar del 
Plata Action Plan. The Action Plan came up with a set of recommendations, and resolutions, 
which, inter alia, include essential components of water management like natural hazard, 
environment, pollution control etc38. More significantly, the Conference considered the issue of 
water management in a holistic and comprehensive manner39. This was meant in effect that an 
international watercourse should be taken as a single whole or unit (from its month to its 
terminus) for the purpose of an integrated management.  Lowi expressed the concept best: 
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Geography suggests that, by virtue of its physical unity, a river basin should be developed as a 
single, indivisible whole, irrespective of political divisions. This is because water binds land 
areas together as it flows toward an outlet, and interference with the water and its movement at 
any point has repercussions else where is the basin40. 
The necessity of protecting and preserving the ecosystem is also recognized under the 1997 UN 
Framework Convention on the Law of Non- Navigational uses of International Watercourses. To 
this effect, Art. 20 of the Convention imposed a duty on watercourse states to protect and 
preserve the ecosystems of the international watercourse individually and where appropriate 
jointly. Art. 23 of the Convention provides for the specific protection and preservation of the 
Marine environment. The provision runs: 
Water course states shall, individually and when appropriate, in cooperation with other states, 
take all measures with respect to an international watercourse that are necessary to protect and 
preserve the marine environment, including estuaries, taking into account generally accepted 
rules and standards. 
 Hence, if negotiation on cooperation over basins doesn't take a wide- angle view to incorporate 
the issue of an integrated water resource management as one component the resource would be 
driven to the edge of its natural limit and there would be river closure. Ultimately, this would 
render the targeted economic benefits to be unsustainable. Therefore, concern for the safety of 
the aquatic environment is not an option especially in the face of the current climate change that 
is impacting the hydrological cycle and thereby the resources base of the water resource. 
From the point of environmental consideration, the Mekong Agreement clearly incorporated 
issues of sustainable development in relation to the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment. The vision statement of the basin clearly addresses the issues when it defines its 
objective to be "An economically prosperous, socially just and environmentally sound Mekong 
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river basin" 41 In addition; environmental program is incorporated as one of the basin’s core 
programs42. 
To conclude, it can be noted that watercourse states should bring their desire for the utmost 
extraction of economic benefits in harmony with the quest for healthy marine environment. To 
achieve this, cooperative negotiations should put agendas of environmental concern on the 
discussion table. 
4.1.3 Peace and Security Considerations. 
Putting an end to a potential conflict that may arise from acts of unilateralism is one of the 
benefits that cooperation brings about. This conflict preventive role of cooperation is so 
significant given the fact that a scarce resource like water is serving competing needs in 
agriculture, industry, urban and rural population across several watercourse states. It is held that 
the vital nature of freshwater is a powerful incentive to move stakeholders toward cooperation. 
Mikhail Gorbachev, Chair, Green Cross International is quoted to have said that "water has the 
power to move millions of people - let it move us in the direction of peace"43  
The transformation of potential conflict into a cooperative potential basically rests from the 
perception of looking water not as source of competition and conflict, but as an incentive for 
mutual cooperation through the instrumentality of equitable agreements and treaties 44  An 
international watercourse which is characterized by conflict would not have an opportunity to 
holistically manage the basin and extract the maximum and diversified benefits that the basin can 
offer. 
The peace and security dividend is not a type of benefit that can be extracted immediately. It is 
after confidence and mutual trust reign among the riparian states of the watercourse that the 
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benefit of peace and security can be sensed. Jordan River Basin is the best example in bringing 
relative peace and security to otherwise unfriendly neighbors. As Jordan River is the major 
source of water available to Jordan and Israel, it was one basic component of the 1994 Peace 
Treaty between the two riparian countries. They have resolved the water issues by agreeing on 
allocation regime and by now the two riparians are out of a "legal state of war". This 
demonstrates the fact that water has a unique inducing character in bringing hostile riparians to 
forge cooperation in the face of disputes over other issues45.   
In the Nile Basin context, other than benefits of economic and environmental nature peace and 
security is also incorporated as an incentive to cooperation. To this effect, one of the primary 
objectives of the NBI is defined to be:"To develop the water resources of the Nile Basin in a 
sustainable and equitable way to ensure prosperity, security and peace for all its peoples". 
Evidence shows that co-riparians with water related treaties are much more in a cooperative 
mood than co- riparians with out such a treaty46. 
Once an equitable and fairly reciprocated water agreement is negotiated and signed riparians are 
more inclined to keep the agreement intact despite the prevalence of some disagreements over 
non-water issues. The best illustration of this scenario is the case in the Mekong River Basin. 
This regional cooperation had been able to survive violent conflicts like the Vietnam War and 
the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia and ideological differences during the cold   war47. Not only this, 
even during events of conflict between co- riparians contractual commitments enshrined in a 
water agreement were observed. The case of Thailand and Laos is a relevant illustration. While 
Laos and Thailand were in a state of conflict, Laos never hesitated to provide Thailand with 
hydro electricity and Thailand continued to pay the bill48. 
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The most important point to make here is the fact that cooperation over water has a lot to 
contribute in letting state relation to continue even in the face of violent conflicts. This is 
possible, because riparians are not willing to disrupt the some how stabilized relation brought 
about by cooperation over water. By doing so, states are in effect protecting their respective and 
treaty-based benefits over water issues. 
The benefit generated from cooperation over water apart from enabling to reduce costs of 
military expenditure for violent conflict may also result in radiating trust and confidence that 
would allow a policy shift to developmental engagements and ultimately opens up an 
opportunity to undergo a broader regional cooperation and integration in other economic and 
social sectors too49 . This dynamics demonstrate illustrates the interplay that exists between 
benefits because of the river and benefits beyond the river. The type of benefits, the challenge 
they resolve and the opportunities they open up is briefly explained in the table below. 
TABLE 0-1 Type of Cooperation and Benefits on International Rivers 
Type The challenge The opportunities 
Type 1- increasing benefit to 
the river. 
Degraded water quality, watersheds 
wetlands and biodiversity.  
Improved water quality, river flow 
characteristics, soil conservation biodiversity 
and over all sustainability.  
Type 2- increasing benefits 
from the river. 
Increasing demands for water, sub-
optimal water resources management and 
development. 
Improved water resources management for 
hydropower and agricultural production, 
flood drought management. 
Type 3- reducing costs because 
of the river. 
Tense regional relations and political 
economy impacts. 
Policy shift to cooperation and development, 
away from dispute/conflict; from food (and 
energy), self-sufficiency to food (and energy) 
security; reduced dispute/conflict risk and 
military expenditure. 
Type 4-increasing benefits 
beyond the river. 
Regional fragmentation Integration of regional infrastructure, markets 
and trade 
Source; Sadoff and Grey (2002) 
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4.2    BRIEF OVERVIEW OF AREAS OF COOPERATION   ON THE 
BASIS   OF COMPARATIVE   ADVANTAGES. 
4.2.1 Context 
The Nile basin countries are longing for poverty eradication, food security and a sustainable 
economic growth in the long run. To materialize this common objective an equitable utilization 
of the common water resource was found to be imperative, and this fact had been the major drive 
that resulted in the establishment of the NBI. 
To harmonize competing needs for water from the common resource, the NBCs came to the 
understanding that a demand for water for a specific purpose in one riparian state may not 
necessarily be in conflict with the interest of the other riparian state. To this end they have agreed 
on the conceptualization and realization of benefit sharing mechanism as it is evidenced from the 
endorsement of the "socio-economic development and benefit sharing" project by the Nile-Com 
along with other six projects. 
Putting into effect benefit sharing schemes however, demands the assessment of different 
comparative advantages that all riparian states may command. Therefore, the task of looking into 
the comparative advantage of the watercourse states is at the heart of the concept of benefit 
sharing. From this perspective, assessing the comparative advantages that Ethiopia, Egypt and 
Sudan would have is crucially important in developing a feasible and economically paying 
benefit sharing mechanism in the Eastern Nile context. Such analysis is necessitated because the 
tremendous amount and variety of resource potentials from which benefits are to be extracted are 
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Ethiopia represents 58% of the total potential in the sub-basin in terms of generating 
hydroelectric power50. At the level of the sub-basin it is only 11% of the total potential that have 
been exploited. At a country level Ethiopia has only managed to exploit less than 2% of her 
available hydropower potential51. Therefore, as more than half of the total potential lies within 
the Ethiopian territory (owing to its higher latitude), Ethiopia do have a comparative advantage 
over the other watercourse states from the hydropower point of view. 
The development of hydroelectric power in Ethiopia, not only provide dependable, low- cost 
hydropower to the basin states, for their economic development, but it would also render 
downstream benefits in controlling flood, easing siltation and cascading water to the irrigated 
agriculture of the downstream countries52. Such a coordinated scenario of using the water of the 
Nile changes the traditional perception of considering it as a stocked commodity, rather than a 
flow. 
Hydropower plant development in Ethiopia and its transmission at an affordable price to other 
downstream states would facilitate socioeconomic development, which is to certain extent 
inhibited by power constraint. The Aswan Dam, which, according to an estimate made in 1994, 
is not capable of providing more than 20% of Egypt’s power demand. Egypt, to seek the balance 
had to go using its gas and oil resource, which is very expensive, viewed in relation to 
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hydropower53. Because of such a power limitation it is argued that economic development in 
Egypt is constrained not for want of water but power54.   
Power constraint in Sudan is also a set back. According to the assessment made in 1994, woody 
biomass, petroleum products, non woody biomass and hydroelectricity represent 71%, 19 %, 8% 
and 2% of the total power balance of the country respectively55.The highest percentage of woody 
biomass denotes the highest rate of deforestation while the petroleum figure implies the 
expensive nature of the power supply. This minimum percentage of hydropower is generated 
from the three hydropower plants built before 1970 and is highly affected by the magnitude of 
flow variability from the Blue Nile56. Therefore, the general pattern of energy source of Sudan 
implies the necessity of having a sustainable and affordable power supply from a hydropower 
plant. 
A project appraisal document of the NBI Regional Power Trade Project indicated the basin's 
power requirement to be 39GW in 2010 and 65 GW in 2020. To address this power demand 
12,000 MW of new capacity should be installed every year at a cost ranging between US $ 10 to 
20B57. From this pattern of growing need for power and its huge financial implication, the 
Eastern Nile basin will have its share. This hard fact makes the development of hydropower at a 
cost-effective site (most reasonably in Ethiopia) a timely assignment for the basin states. 
Unlocking this tremendous hydropower potential demands a financial commitment from all the 
stakeholders. Through a negotiated arrangement access to the power generated at a price that 
takes into account the level of financial or otherwise contribution towards the realization of the 
project would be appropriate. It is because of this understanding that basin states in the Eastern 
                                                          
53
 Inter Africa Group, Trans- boundary water Resources in the Nile basin: Strengthening Civil Society 
Engagement in the Nile Basin Initiative 114 (2005) 
54
 Diann Rizzolio Karyabwite, UNEP, Water Sharing in the Nile River Valley 36 (2006) 
55





 World Bank, Project Appraisal Document for Regional Power Trade Project [NBI-SVP], 4 (2005) 
[THE CONCEPT OF BENEFIT SHARING IN THE 
CONTEXT OF THE EASTERN NILE BASIN] 
 
 
84 CHAPTER FOUR: BENEFIT SHARING – A FRAMWORK FOR THEORETICAL ANALYSIS |  
 
Nile jointly formulate The Regional Power Trade Project as one of the thematic project of the 
Shared Vision Program with a mission to establish the institutional pillar to coordinate and 
facilitate regional power market via the creation of the Nile Basin Power Forum58. It is to be 
noted that the hydropower potential in the Eastern Nile basin is so enormous that, 
interconnection is feasible even to the Equatorial Lakes Region59.  
Given the highest economic potential that can be reaped from hydropower development for its 
national consumption and the revenue generated from power marketing for other basin states, 
Ethiopia do have compelling incentive to engage in tapping this vital resource on joint and 
unilateral basis.  
The identification and presentation to the NBI of 13 (thirteen) hydropower projects for 
implementation in Nov 2000, is a clear manifestation of this strong desire60. In concrete terms, 
hydropower development projects in Baro, Gibe, Birbir and Karadobi have won the approval of 
the Nile COM under the umbrella of the SAP61.   
B. Watershed Management 
 A greatest environmental and economic benefit can also be extracted from watershed 
management schemes from the high lands of Ethiopia. Such an arrangement especially benefits 
downstream states through reducing erosion and thereby mitigating sediment load that originates 
from the Abay Blue Nile and Tekez–Atbara river system62. This intervention would ultimately 
boost power generation potential of hydropower plants downstream; reduce costs for the 
maintenance of irrigation canals, pumps and costs for the removal of sedimentation63. These 
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downstream benefits can be economically quantified and be the basis of payment as one possible 
aspect of benefit sharing for an upstream basin state .In the long run concerted management in 
the watershed management will facilitate economic development and poverty alleviation of the 
rural population of the basin states which are languishing under the merciless pain of poverty 
principally owing to the high degree of natural resource degradation64. The Nile Basin states 
aware of this tremendous potential have incorporated watershed management as a project 
package at a basin level in their Shared Vision Program and at the sub basin level in the 
Subsidiary Action Program. In the Eastern Nile Basin, Watershed Management as one 
component of cooperation is envisaged in the JMP (Joint Multi -Purpose Projects)65. 
C. Livestock 
Ethiopia stands to have the leading figure in the number of herds in Africa. This quantitative 
supremacy if managed in terms of quality as well would be a significant source of economic 
development. The joint exploitation of the livestock potential in Ethiopia would enable Egypt 
and Sudan with a constant and affordable supply of meat66. 
4.2.1.2 Sudan 
In the Eastern Nile basin the greatest agricultural potential via irrigation lies in Sudan. The 
potential manifests itself in the high quality alluvial soil between the Blue Nile and White Nile 
rivers in the Eastern part of the country coupled with the largest reserve of cultivable land (about 
47 million hectares) in Sub Sahara Africa67. Of this estimated potential, Sudan has only managed 
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to develop 1.9 million hectare according to the World Bank study in 200668. Because of this 
tremendous potential Sudan is sometimes labeled to be the "bread basket" of the sub-basin and 
beyond. 
Joint development of irrigated agriculture would enable the basin countries to enhance their 
capacity to ensure food security and alleviate poverty in the long run in line with the Millennium 
Development Goals which seeks to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger (Goal 1) by reducing 
by 50% people living with less than US1 dollar a day by 2015. 
This is critically important especially for Ethiopia and Sudan where the number of population 
living with less than a dollar per day represent a significant segment of their people (31.3%) in 
the case of Ethiopia according to the world Bank report of 200669 and where the contribution of 
the agricultural sector to the GDP is remarkable i.e., 47.7% in the case of Ethiopia and 33.7% in 
the case of Sudan70. 
Despite the existence of arable land suitable for irrigation development the water supply to 
support the scheme within the country is far below than required. Thus, agricultural development 
is bottlenecked for want of sufficient water availability71 . This situation discloses the very 
important cooperative linkage especially with Ethiopia to secure the necessary water provision. 
To ensure such a cascading of water on a much more dependable basis water reservoir works in 
the highlands of Ethiopia would be imperative, which could also generate hydropower for mutual 
benefit. This scenario highlights the natural interconnectedness of hydropower and agriculture in 
the Eastern Nile basin. Thus, Sudan's comparative advantage in irrigation potential makes sense 
in as much as it is linked to the water supply from Ethiopia. Such interplay establishes the very 
merit of cooperative framework for sharing benefits. 
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Harnessing the irrigation potential jointly would also give rise to the importance of engagement 
in the development of agro- industries to meet the growing demand for food, drink and clothing 
across the basin72. Well-managed joint engagement in the agricultural and power development 
sector will offer abundant layers of benefits over other sectors too. Therefore, benefit-sharing 
mechanism should be conceived from a wider perspective as mutual interdependence between 
and among different sectors is one important aspects of it.  
4.2.1.3 Egypt 
A. Agriculture 
The greatest consumer of water in Egypt is the agricultural sector. It claims about 86% of the 
available water73. However, the sector with such high degree of consumption of the already 
scarce water is not able to ensure food security. Its contribution to the overall GDP is very 
insignificant. As per the report of the 2006 FAO report its contribution to the GDP was only 
13.974. Unable to depend on the local agricultural output for food security, Egypt had to look to 
international market to find the balance of food supply 75 . Efforts to meet the deficit by 
reclaiming additional irrigable land didn’t produce the desired effect. Assessment of data in the 
1980s revealed that agricultural outputs coming from the newly reclaimed lands had to 
contribute less than 1% to the overall agricultural production76. 
However, the failure of the agricultural sector is only related to crops (like maize, sorghum, rice 
and Sugar Cane) which are very water consuming and less yielding for a unit of water. The 
reallocation of water from such crops to high value and less water demanding agricultural 
products would enable Egypt to establish comparative advantage over other basin countries. 
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Because of such a perception, it is argued that Egypt stands to benefit much by specializing on 
the production of high revenue generating agricultural products aimed to be exported to 
European and Middle Eastern markets77 .This comparative advantage is more real given the 
hundred years of irrigated   experience of the country. 
B. Aquaculture. 
Fish farming is another economic sector that Egypt undoubtedly would have a comparative 
advantage. Egypt stands seventh globally in fish farming. In the African context Egypt is leading 
the sector in terms of high production 78 . The fishing industry is becoming significant for 
achieving food security, although food security is mostly assessed in terms of the availability of 
agricultural crops79. 
It should be stressed, however, that some of the comparative advantages that have been dealt 
with in relation to the basin countries are not closed lists. As cooperation intensifies other sectors 
of cooperation will open up. For instance, operating a refinery and distribution system jointly in 
Sudan would ensure sustainable access and fair price deal among the basin states. A boost in 
agricultural products in Sudan, especially of raw materials (cotton) for the Egyptian textile 
industry would secure market for farmers in Sudan, and generate additional employment 
opportunities in Egypt80.   
In conclusion, it is important to note that, benefit sharing is a practical expression of the common 
vision developed by riparians sharing the same international river .It goes through three logical 
steps. First, the stake holders need to reach at a common understanding as to expectations of 
benefits from the benefit sharing framework. Secondly, the stake holders should identify the 
scope and categories of benefits (baskets of benefits) to be extracted and finally the magnitude of 
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the basket of benefits has to be determined in such away as to result in a positive –sum-
outcome. 81 Optimal extraction of diverse benefits nonetheless, demands a profound 
understanding by the stake holders as to the greatest potential that a transboundary river would 
have in releasing many tangible and intangible benefits if managed in a cooperative framework. 
It means, in effect, doing away with “business as usual” approach. 
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 CHAPTER FIVE: SETTING BENEFIT SHARING IN MOTION  
The Nile Basin States have unanimously developed a common vision which is supposed to guide 
their future and joint common water resource management for the betterment of their respective 
peoples’ economic and social wellbeing.  To this end, the shared vision longs “to achieve 
sustainable socio-economic development through equitable utilization of and benefit from, the 
common Nile Basin water resources”. Such a vision statement signifies the very fact that the 
mutual development and management of the Nile waters is to be guided by the principle of 
equitable utilization.  The embodiment of this principle in the shared vision statement is in fact 
an adherence to one of the cardinal principle of international water law as enshrined under Art 5 
of the 1997 UN Framework Convention. 
The real challenge of establishing equitability to the taste of all the stakeholders in the basin, 
however, lies ahead.  Resolving such an issue appears to be a testing exercise in a basin of many 
players like the Nile and in a situation where economic, political and geographical power 
asymmetries prevail which ultimately would determine the bargaining strength of the basin 
states.82  In light of the hitherto unresolved legacy of the 1959 water agreement which is not 
taken to be fair and equitable, designing a formula that ensures equitability of use through a fresh 
look at the existing use is the essence of the Nile problematique83. Unless and otherwise a 
consensus is reached on this problematique ensuring equitability in the use of the Nile waters 
appears to be a long shot.  
Be that as it may, the question of framing equitable formulae for equitable utilization would be 
of a negotiated settlement and because of this reason a “one-size fits all” approach doesn’t 
function.  As it has already been discussed infra arriving at an acceptable scheme of benefit 
sharing and trading this finite resource for non- zero or integrative solution demands different 
scenarios of compromise which calls for working-out compensatory schemes for those who gain 
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less by those who are to benefit more out of the jointly developed economic venture.  This 
compensatory arrangement is so crucial to keep least beneficiaries onboard the cooperation 
truck.  Hence, the question of effecting equitable benefit sharing demands two approaches, i.e. 
aspiring to share benefits in an equitable manner and framing a mechanism by which 
compensation can be made. 
In order to ensure distributive justice, in the context of sharing benefits, partners ought to be 
accommodative and responsive to claims and suspicions of their fellow stakeholders.  
Negotiation on benefit sharing should be conducted with utmost possible good faith and sense of 
consideration for the legitimate and reasonable interest of others.  It should never reduce to a 
mere exercise of rehearsing one’s own interest to the detriment of other partners.  In this regard 
Savenije and Zagg identified four elements that need to be adhered to in the course of negotiating 
international cooperation in water resource management. The first element is the principle of 
good neighborliness which underlines the mutual interdependence of watercourse states so that 
they should strive to resolve emerging problems through the conclusion of treaties and putting in 
place resultant institutions.  Recognizing riparian interests is the second element.  This demands 
basin states to appreciate the special interest that a riparian state may have over the common 
water resource in as much as it is not incompatible with the mutual and individual interest.  The 
third element is the development of joint activities which is the actualization of commonly 
designed protects.  The last phase is the ultimate effect of the other three elements which is the 
transformation of crises into tangible opportunities.84   
5.1    The 1997 UN Convention as an Aiding Tool 
Benefit sharing as one possible variant of transboundary water management was envisaged in 
The 1997 UN Convention. The reference both to the “utilization” and “benefits” in the 
formulation of Art.5 signifies such a fact85. Factors enumerated to establish equitability under 
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Art.6 are basically meant for volumetric allocation86.This is so because establishing equitability 
in a benefit sharing framework is basically a negotiated settlement on a project by project basis. 
Nonetheless, guidelines under Art.6 would still be of relevant application by reducing some of 
the factors into measurable economic units87.  
As already discussed the Draft Cooperative Framework Agreement of the Nile Basin under Art 
4/2 went further to add two additional variables to be considered in establishing equitable use. 
Whatever agreed unit value is attached to these basic variables they would represent a different 
figure to all the watercourse states as it would be shown from interpreting the data in the 
following tables. 
 
TABLE 0-1 AREA OF NILE COUNTRIES IN THE NILE BASIN. 
 
Country Total area of 
the country 
(Km2) 
Area of the 
country within 
the basin(Km2) 
As % of total 
area of basin 
(%) 
As % of total 
area of country 
(%) 
Egypt 1,001,450 326,751 10.5 32.6 
Ethiopia 1,127,127 365,117 11.7 33.2 
Sudan 2,505,810 1,978,506 63.6 79.0 
     Source - S.A. Mason (2004) quoting FAO 1997a. 
 
TABLE 0-2 DEPENDENCY RATIO OF COUNTRIES ON THE NILE WATERS. 
Country Dependency Ratio (%) 
Egypt 97 
Ethiopia 0 
Sudan  66 
Source:  S. Mason 2004 (adopted)  
 




 Jhon Waterbury, Between Unilateralism and Comprehensive Accords: Modest Steps toward 
Cooperation in International River Basins, 13 Water Resource Development 279, 285(1997).   
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TABLE 0-3CONTRIBUTION OF WATER TO THE NILE RIVER (%) 
 Country Contribution (%) 
Egypt nil 
Ethiopia 86.0 




 Source: Tesfaye Tafesse 2001 quoting Whittington, Dale and McClelland, 
Elizabeth, 1992  (adopted) 
As it is evident from a look at Table5.1 Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan do have different 
geographical extent in the overall basin area.  Under such a scenario, Sudan which has the largest 
drainage area within the basin will benefit much out of the scoring white Egypt and Ethiopia will 
have almost similar grade.  When contribution of water (Table5.3) is considered Ethiopia will 
have a 100% grade as neither Egypt nor Sudan contribute nothing to the water flow of the Nile 
Basin.  
In terms of dependency ratio (Table5.2) Egypt stands to benefit more than Sudan while Ethiopia 
will get nil.  In this regard some inquiry appears to be imperative.  The dependency ratio analysis 
seem to have considered as to whether there is any other source of water for basin states’ 
agricultural, industrial and municipal use and not the result of a conclusion that the Nile water is 
irrelevant for Ethiopian’s development endeavor.  From this point of view the issue of 
dependency ratio as a possible input in the determination of equitability may demand a fresh 
look.  
Population size dependent on the Nile waters is also one factor to be considered as it is indicated 
under Art 4/2/C of the Draft Cooperative Framework Agreement.  This determinant variable is 
becoming a significant factor as access to water is taken to be a human right issue as back as 
1948 when the universal Declaration of Human Right (UDHR) was adopted under the auspices 
of the United Nations.  To this effect Art 25 of the declaration provided:    
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well being of himself 
and his family, including food, clothing, and housing and medical care and necessary social 
services... 
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Even though access to water as an individual human right is not specifically indicated 
expressions like the standard of living adequate for the health and well being of himself and of 
his family including food implies water as a necessary input towards the realization of such 
rights, thus water being obliquely inherent as a human right88.  A part from this the Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of the United Nations had reinterpreted and concluded 
in 2002 that provisions of Art 11 and 12 of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (CESCR) are human right issues89.  Such a conceptual understanding of access to water 
had achieved recognition when the United Nations Millennium Development Goals, under its 7th 
Goal targeted to reduce by half the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe 
drinking water in 2015 90 .  This characterization of water as a human right stimulated an 
argument by many activist NGOs that the provision of water shall remain within the domain of 
the public sector lest commercializing water through the private sector would endanger its free or 
subsidized supply91.  
As discussed above, since water is not only an economic good but a social good too, any 
contemplated benefit sharing formula should allot equal value to each and every citizen 
dependent on a common water resource. Viewed from the size of population dependent on the 
Nile waters Egypt would claim the highest grade followed by Sudan while Ethiopia would have 
the least grade.  
Generally speaking, albeit, Art 6 of the 1997 UN Framework Convention would be of much help 
in providing, natural (physical) social, economic and population variables to be considered as an 
aiding tool, a workable benefit sharing arrangement would come out of the innovative bargaining 
exercise of all the stake holders by taking into account the peculiar nature of the basin and the 
diversified social and economic needs of the basin states.      
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5.2   Types of Benefit Sharing Mechanisms 
Once a formula to share benefits is developed, it is imperative to see what form (type) the 
benefits to be shared would take.  Out of the four benefits that have already been discussed those 
economically quantifiable are the ones to be subjected to benefit sharing mechanisms.  In this 
regard, benefit from the river (direct economic benefit) is much more relevant.  Benefits to the 
river, benefits because of the river, and benefits beyond the river are not easily quantifiable in 
terms of clear economic unit as they are intangible benefits.  
Even though, the following different types of benefit sharing mechanisms are concepts basically 
developed for benefit sharing from dam projects in relation to dam affected communities92 the 
concept can still be analyzed for benefit sharing scenarios in a wider perspective.  
5.2.1 Revenue Sharing and Constituting a Trust Fund  
Revenue sharing envisages a situation where common projects produce an output above the 
needs of the basin states and where it is possible to commercialize the out put beyond the basin 
and generate revenue to be shared among the basin states.  A high capacity hydropower plant, 
eco- tourism, extensive irrigated agriculture is among the many projects that can generate 
revenue through commercialization within and beyond the basin.    
In addition to sharing revenues from jointly owned and operated projects, bringing such revenues 
under the common reserve as a trust fund for further investment or for upgrading the already 
existing ones is another possible scenario of enhancing the pie.   
5.2.2 Preferential Rates and Purchase Agreements  
Preferential fee contemplates a situation where a partner, for instance, in a jointly developed 
hydropower plant may have a relatively lower rate of tariff depending on the highest input of one 
or the other type.  The LHWP (Lesotho Highland Water Project) extended this scenario to an 
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extreme situation where the benefit of hydropower generated went exclusively to Lesotho while 
the water was transferred to South Africa against the payment of an agreed sum of money. 
A purchase agreement for water is one phenomenon in the context of water allocation.  For this 
mechanism to operate, property rights over water need first be established.  Such an arrangement 
enables the buyer to have an access to water on the basis of an assigned right without transferring 
water right per se93. This mechanism helps to tranquilize water scarcity within a basin as a state 
with a relatively abundant water resource can transact the resource against the payment of an 
agreed sum of money. Purchase agreements can also be negotiated for agricultural products, 
fisheries and other outputs of a common project and hence can be used to re-allocate or configure 
benefits of water use as between riparians94.   
5.3   Major Challenges of Implementation 
Signing a cooperative agreement over the utilization of transboundary water is one major step 
while realizing the agreement on the ground in line with its letter and spirit is quite another 
matter.  However, deep the professionalism and commitment of technical experts may be, a 
transboundary water management would not bear the desired fruit in an environment where the 
corresponding political and financial commitment is lacking.      
5.3.1 Political Commitment as a Decisive Tool of Implementation  
The management of international water treaties is a complex process that involves different 
phases, i.e. from conceptualization to realization. Cooperative agreements over transboundary 
water would not be able to defuse potential conflict and move the basin out of the zero -sum 
predicaments without unswerving political steadfastness.  Thus, if basin states really meant to 
use fresh water as a tool of economic and social development they need to go long miles to see to 
it that what they meant in the text is realized on the ground.  As the virtue of any international 
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agreement is its implementation, the crux of the matter is not the mere conclusion of the treaty 
but the concretization of the same.  There are water treaties with impressive and broader 
common vision but fall short of full scale implementation for lack of the desired political 
commitment.  The Mekong Basin is a case in point.  The periodical financial contribution which 
should be made by member basin states to the MRC (Mekong River Commission) has not been 
fully paid, despite the 1995 Mekong Agreement and persistent international effort to that effect95.  
Furthermore, the MRC had lost its relevance over issues of hydropower development within the 
basin as regards Thailand and Laos96.  A political engagement can not be secured easily in a 
climate of political distrust and in a situation where the issue of water is not desecuritized.  
Especially ensuring political commitment throughout is a difficult task as perceptions of 
cooperation may vary from time to time.  It would be even much more difficult in basin states 
where mature and established democracy is lacking and where a change in the political sphere 
may bring a fresh and even an incompatible view with its predecessor thereby posing a real 
challenge for implementation.  
Savenije and Van der Zaag conceptually developed a metaphor for an effective management of 
shared river basins where politics is taken to be one of the pillars in sharing common water 
resources (see fig. 1 below)       
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Figure 0-1 The Classical Temple of Sharing International Water Resources 
 Source: - Savenije & Zaag (2000) 
It is underlined that the interplay among the three conceptualized pillars is vital to arrive at 
equitable sharing of international waters. Thus it is emphasized:  
The central pillar is that of technical cooperation, which may also be called the operational 
pillar.  The two side pillars are the political pillar, responsible for an enabling environment, 
and the institutional pillar responsible for laws and institutions.  All three pillars are necessary 
to arrive at a balanced and equitable sharing of international waters.  If one of the side pillars 
is weak, meaning either a low political commitment or inadequate legal and institutional 
arrangement, the sharing of international river basins may not be firmly embedded and is 
prone to unbalanced management decisions.97  
Even though, the harmonization of the three pillars is of utmost importance, the greatest value 
should be attached to the political pillar as it is this particular pillar (the enabling environment) 
which is the source of an effective legal and institutional framework.  This signifies the 
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fundamental point that the greatest effort by all the stake holders must be geared towards 
mobilizing the political will.  At least, the level and momentum of the political will as it has been 
at the conclusion of the treaty right up to the phase of implementation is enormously important. 
Though the Temple refers to a water sharing arrangement its relevance in the context of benefit 
sharing scenario is apparent.  
5.3.2 Financial Resource Constraint  
Transboundary river basin management connotes considerable financial expenses ranging from 
administrative costs to investment capital.  This financial implication is tremendous in the 
context of a benefit sharing framework as it involves the design and execution of various 
projects.  Owing to the low level of economic development of the Nile riparians and the capital 
intensive nature of the projects (especially a hydropower development) financing such projects 
via locally generated capital is a big challenge.  
In the Eastern Nile context, for instance (the Eastern Nile power Trade program under the SVP) 
the pre-feasibility study of the Mandaya (Ethiopia) hydropower project entails a project cost of 
more than 2.4 billion USD.98   Similarly the same study for the Boarder hydropower project 
(Ethiopia) needs an investment capital of more than 1.4 billion USD.99  In addition, the karadobi 
and Mabil hydropower generating plants are estimated to cost more than 2.2 billion USD and 1.7 
billion USD respectively as their initial construction cost. 100   These are some instances to 
illustrate the capital intensive nature of projects on hydropower generation.  Such a massive 
amount of capital can not be solely squeezed from basin states unless multilateral financial 
entities are involved. In this regard the International Consortium for Cooperation on the Nile 
(ICCON) can be taken to be a positive financial initiative.  The Consortium was able to receive 
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pledges of support that worth USD 140 million in June 2001.101  This amount appears to be very 
insignificant viewed against the estimated total financial requirement for phase I NBI projects 
which are expected to reach 3 billion USD.102 Besides the mandate to pool a financial resource, 
the Consortium established what is called the NBTF (Nile Basin Trust Fund) which aspires to 
provide “Streamlined, cost-effective funding...which would consolidate donor support and 
ensure the clarity and cohesiveness of the program.”103   
Despite such initiatives, the project costs cannot be expected to be fully covered by multilateral 
and bilateral funding thereby raising funds by the basin states themselves a necessity.  Such an 
assignment for basin states of poor economic performance would not be easily met.  This serious 
financial constraint would have an inevitable effect in prolonging the realization of the common 
vision and impacting the quest and the pace for the badly desired economic development and 
poverty alleviation. 
It is also argued that, high dependence on banks and donors would make the management 
exercise of the basin vulnerable and as a result it is recommended that decision making, 
financing and benefiting befall in one hand.104 In a bid to move toward improving financial self 
sufficiency the Global Water Partnership (2003) advised basin states to recognize water as an 
economic good and recovering cost as much as possible from users.105  It is, however, imperative 
to take cognizance of the fact that ensuring access to water as a human right and the recognition 
of the same as a social and cultural value should not be overwhelmed by the sole drive to reclaim 
costs.  
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From whatever source finance for investment may be earmarked the financial issue would 
remain a tremendous impairment in the context of implementing integrated plans in a basin 
inhabited by poor states of the Nile type. 
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
In the face of growing water scarcity in the world considering water as a fixed stock and going to 
share this scarce resource in the traditional way was not found to be viable. Such a new 
perspective of looking at a transboundary water problem has lent hands for a new thinking that 
takes water as a continuous flow that can generate many, diversified and sustainable benefits to 
all the stake holders. The outstanding rational for such a preference therefore, basically lies on 
the basic understanding that if water is viewed as flow and not as a stock optimum utilization of 
the same is possible. Such a new approach is to be made a reality through the instrumentality of 
what is called benefit sharing arrangements. Cooperative engagement would enable the optimum 
utilization of the existing water resource through the design and execution of common 
developmental projects and the distribution of their economic outputs amongst the basin states. 
A successful cooperative management of a transboundary river would, other than direct 
economic benefits, deliver multifaceted benefits including ecosystem protection and diffusing 
potential conflicts over competing uses of the common water resources. As cooperation takes 
root the basket of benefits will enhance and transcend to areas of cooperation in non- water 
related sectors, e.g., the use of common currency, free movement of people, goods and services 
within the basin. In the long run, it may even lead to regional integration. Conceptually benefit 
sharing rests on a clear perception by all the stake holders as to why and how cooperation over 
transboundary water is to be managed. Such an understanding all along demands a clear 
understanding as to how costs and benefits can be apportioned amongst the basin sates. 
To ensure such optimal utility and to transform the conflict potential into a cooperative potential 
that enables a positive sum outcome the concept of benefit sharing has been introduced in the 
Nile Basin discourse through the instrumentality of the Nile Basin Initiative. Currently it is under 
going a taste in the Eastern Nile Basin.  
In the Nile basin where water scarcity is having a counter productive effect in the whole effort of 
ensuring food security and speeding up economic development, the application of the concept is 
quite relevant. To realize the concept to the mutual advantage of the basin states win-win 
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projects are designed at a basin and a sub basin level.  Feasibility studies have also been 
conducted, especially in the power trade sector .The design and implementation of these and 
other projects is  supposed to produce mutual trust and confidence that may be of some impetus 
for concluding a permanent cooperative framework agreement.  
As the Nile basin used to suffer from fierce hydrological confrontation because of the absence of 
a basin wide agreement over the utilization of the common water resource and because of the 
prevailing inequity of the status quo, arrangements that would be of help in nurturing positive 
attitudes are significantly important, though the question still remains as to how long should 
developing mutual trust and confidence should take.  
It is true that the Eastern Nile countries do have different comparative advantages of their own 
which are a very important basis for analyzing a positive -sum –outcome of transboundary water 
opportunities. However, the implementation of NBI projects at a sub-basin level is far behind 
implementation. A more talked about Joint Multi-Purpose Program is still a mere project 
document. By now a passive atmosphere seem to reign over the basin as there is neither an 
implementation of contemplated projects nor promising hope to positively resolve the 
outstanding differences in the draft cooperative framework document which is a basis for a 
would be benefit sharing framework. The expectation that benefit sharing schemes on a project 
by project basis would deliver an impetus for mutual trust and confidence for the birth of 
permanent cooperative framework does not produced the desired effect simply because projects 
are not translated into action and as a result no benefit accrued to basin states. 
 A cooperative frame work agreement that would be able to harmonies the application of the two 
cardinal principles of conventional and customary international law is of immense importance 
for a full scale implementation of benefit sharing arrangements and rectifying the prevailing 
inequity which is a hindrance for the joint development of the common water resources. 
The basic question, in this regard revolves around on whether or not the NBCs would agree on a 
fresh volumetric allocation that would result in the revision of the status quo, as an 
accomplishment of establishing the badly desired equitability.  
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As things stand now there is an apparent polarization on this point. One of the core impediments 
towards the quest for multilateralism in the management of the Nile water resources is the 
prevalence of a strong attitude to maintain the status quo. This attitude can be explained best as 
“free ride mentality” by the downstream states particularly Egypt. Such state of affair is the 
direct manifestation of securitizing the issue of access to the Nile waters as a political instrument 
in their foreign relation dealings. This scenario somehow implicates the Nile to be a partially 
securitized basin. The hydropolitical legacy of the basin which emanated from prior water 
agreements is still a stumbling block on the way to seek an equitable resolution in the utilization 
of the Nile waters. Beneficiaries of the status quo are demanding that the new resolution should 
start from such a status quo. Upstream states, on the other hand are strongly resisting the 
continuation of the existing use.  However, as the prevailing status quo is inequitable by its very 
nature the quest for equitability cannot start from an inequitable foundation.  
The implantation of the concept of water security as a possible tool of breaking the deadlock was 
not able to result in a way forward. Lack of conceptual clarity and its failure to resolve the point 
of departure as prerequisite to ensure water security to all the riparian states is the outstanding 
problem associated with the concept. Leaving aside Egypt’s unequivocal posture to fix the point 
of departure from the existing use, the draft agreement of sub-article (b) of article 14 of the Draft 
Cooperative Framework Agreement as agreed by upstream states is quite dubious as it failed to 
clearly pinpoint from where the reference for water security should start. Hence, the formulation 
of article 14 by both blocks, as it stands now, falls short of resolving the impeding problem. This 
would significantly hamper the way towards the determination of equitable entitlement of the use 
of Nile waters for each riparian country. Addressing the inequity in a manner that would not 
result in a loss to another basin state is therefore, the problematique of the Nile basin water 
management in general and that of the Eastern Nile in particular. If an innovative approach that 
would strike the equilibrium is not to come out from the negotiation process   cooperative 
management would booth and the basin will continue to pose a conflict potential. Hence, 
rectifying the prevailing inequity over the utilization of the Nile water is a sine qua non for the 
optimal realization of benefit sharing .This derives from the conceptual basis that the two options 
are not mutually exclusive but rather mutually reinforcing.  
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At this juncture, it important to look into possible dimensions within which benefit sharing 
arrangements can operate. Accordingly, two scenarios are possible. First there are situations 
where benefits can be generated without the necessity of having a water allocation regime .In this 
context the JMP (Joint Multi-Purpose Program) of the Eastern Nile can be an illustration. Under 
such “three countries one system” approach a multi-purpose dam and reservoirs with associated 
outputs of power generation, transmission system, watershed management, irrigation 
enhancement and flood management is designed to be implemented in the Blue Nile/Main Nile 
sub- basin. This multipurpose developmental project was envisaged upon the understanding that 
the water resources to be utilized by the project would not impact the existing pattern of use in 
the Eastern Nile countries. 
Therefore, such a scenario reveals the fact that the operation of a benefit sharing arrangement 
that did not call for a water sharing arrangement is possible in a situation where benefit sharing 
projects are of such a nature that did not impact the existing use pattern. . But the basic question 
still remains as to whether or not Ethiopia which doesn’t have an allocated water share of the 
Nile as yet and with more than 75,000,000 people is able to ensure food security through such an 
approach. The answer more significantly depends on the establishment of whether or not there is 
enough water resource to support as many projects of this type without impacting the pattern of 
the existing use.  
In other scenarios of benefit sharing where anticipated projects demand  a high consumptive use 
of the common water resource, as for instance in an extensive irrigated agriculture scheme, the 
establishment of  a water right through allocation is of immense importance. Such importance 
basically derives from taking water as an element of contribution and a basis of compensation in 
a benefit sharing scheme. 
Therefore, the very question as to whether benefit sharing as a greater level of cooperation can 
offer the highest possible  positive- sum- outcome is largely contingent up on the equitable 
resolution of the contentious issues is the draft permanent cooperative framework agreement. 
Other agreements on different issues of cooperation without a resolution on the current point of 
difference cannot stand by their own and be of any help in transforming the hydropolitics of the 
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basin to the better. Positive –sum- outcome on the issue demands the resolution of the   
contradiction between recognizing the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization and 
yearning for the status quo. Insisting for the maintenance of the existing use and agreeing upon 
the principle of equitable utilization as one of the governing principle in the utilization of the 
Nile waters are not able to co- exit harmoniously .The theory that the basin hegemon of the basin 
dictates the course of the negotiation process in such a way that fits its self interest by 
disregarding the needs of other basin states seems to be no more relevant in the Nile basin. In the 
face of a growing awareness, by the hitherto neglected basin states, of their natural water rights 
the call for a fair share in the Nile water can not be escaped. Unless a clear and positive stance is 
taken by the downstream countries in renouncing their old posture there is high probability that 
the basin will resort back to the negative- sum predicament. This undesired outcome would close 
any potential for possible cooperative engagements. 
Therefore, looking for an equitable formula that would administer the utilization of the Nile 
waters in whatever modality is not an option as the cost of non- cooperation is too much to bear. 
Failure to reach an agreement means  not only forfeiting the optimum potential of benefits that a 
benefit sharing arrangement can fetch but also heralding aggressive and unguided unilateralism 
that would fan out the conflict potential. Consequently, polarized interpretations of the principles 
of equitable utilization and no significant harm will surface on the hydropolitical battle.  
In terms of justifying the water utilization the upstream states seem to be in a better position for 
the following two reasons. First, the two principles are norms of customary international law and 
as such they operate irrespective of the will and a conclusion of a water treaty by basin states 
.Secondly, upstream states are entitled to use the water within their territory if doing so didn’t 
result in significant harm to downstream states .The question of significant harm is a relative 
term that is subjected to whether a given upstream use is equitable or not. Under such 
circumstances a given use may still be equitable though its effect of harm downstream is 
significant.  
In addition to the above concluding remarks some recommendations as a way forward need to be 
addressed. One of major road block on the way to the equitable resolution over the use of the 
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Nile water is the prevailing big disparity between the demand and supply equation. This is the 
underlying fact behind the threat perception and the securitazion of water especially by the 
downstream state Egypt. The expedition for the solution demands a water management strategy 
that would promote a decrease in demand and a boost in the supply side.  
In this regard, there are repeated suggestions by different scholars to the effect that a headwater 
storage facility would reduce the rate of evaporation and seepage that would enhance the volume 
of water available within the Eastern Nile Basin. It is argued that such additional volume of 
water will be earmarked for the upstream state Ethiopia in the course of configuring equitable 
share through reallocation without significantly affecting the pattern of the existing use. Though, 
there is an apparent utility in employing such a tool there is no much debate as yet on its merit 
and practicality by the stakeholders. Therefore, an in-depth discussion on this issue is timely.  
Efficient utilization of the available water resource through inter- sectoral reallocation i.e., 
reallocating water to a sector that brings a greater economic return for a unit volume of water is 
also   another important tool worthy of application. This is quite relevant in Egypt where the 
agricultural sector‘s contribution to the total GDP is very insignificant despite its highest 
consumption of the water resource. Wastewater reclamation (recycling), and salt water 
desalination are also feasible options to employ. In the agricultural sector using drought and 
salinity resistant crops, using closed pipes as opposed to open drainage systems are important 
tools in mitigating water scarcity. A check on the size of population and enhancing the awareness 
of farmers and the population at large as to the scarcity of water is a useful recommendation for 
basin states where water is seriously in short supply. 
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The following are key elements of the conclusion and recommendations. 
• Optimal exploitation of the potential of a benefit sharing arrangement demands   the 
establishment of an equitable water right over the Nile water. 
• Failure to reach on a consensual resolution over the utilization of the Nile water will give 
rise to aggressive and unguided unilateralism which will have perilous effect to the 
integrity of the ecosystem. 
• Since such a failure would also mean  bringing the hydropolitics of the basin back to a 
zero-sum –outcome  it will exacerbate the conflict potential of the basin which ultimately 
will strain the political and diplomatic relations of the basin states. 
• As a lasting disagreement on the CFA is likely to preclude any mode of cooperation over 
the Nile water, many and divergent potential benefits that the basin will offer would be 
forfeited to the common disadvantage of the basin states. 
• Tools that will have the impact of mitigating the water scarcity problem should be 
seriously examined and be applied. 
• The concerned basin states should strive hard to compromise to reach at an equitable 
disposition as the cost of non-cooperation is too high to bear. 
• International financial and developmental partners should exert their effort more than 
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